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IMPEACHMENT IN FLORIDA
FREDERICK B. KARL* AND MARGUERITE DAVIS**
What was the practice before this in cases where the chief Magis-
trate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was had to assas-
sination in wch. he was not only deprived of his life but of the
opportunity of vindicating his character. It wd. be the best way
therefore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment
of the Executive when his misconduct should deserve it, and for
his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused.,
Impeachment is the civilized alternative to assassination as a
means of removing high-ranking public officials found guilty of mis-
conduct in office. The United States Constitution provides that the
President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States
shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.2 The Flor-
ida constitution of 1968 provides that the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, members of the Cabinet, 3 justices of the supreme court,
judges of the district courts of appeal, and circuit judges shall be
liable to impeachment for misdemeanor in office.4 The earlier Flor-
ida constitutions contained similar impeachment provisions. 5
Unlike executive and judicial officeholders, Florida legislators are
not subject to impeachment. In this respect, they are like Congress-
* LL.B. 1949, John B. Stetson University. Member of The Florida Bar; Justice of the
Florida Supreme Court; Counsel to the Florida House of Representatives Judicial Impeach-
ment Committee, 1975.
** J.D. 1971, Florida State University. Member of The Florida Bar; Research Assistant to
Justice Frederick B. Karl, Florida Supreme Court; former Assistant to former Justice B.K.
Roberts, Florida Supreme Court.
1. Dr. Benjamin Franklin, Federal Convention (July 20, 1787) (in debate on the question
"Shall the Executive Be Removable on Impeachments"), summarized in 2 M. FARRAND, THE
REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (3d ed. 1966).
2. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 4.
3. The Cabinet consists of the secretary of state, attorney general, comptroller, treasurer,
commissioner of agriculture, and commissioner of education. FLA. CONsT. art. IV, § 4(a). (See.
appendix for the Constitution Revision Commission's proposed revision of § 4(a).)
4. Id. art. III, § 17(a).
See appendix for the Constitution Revision Commission's proposed revision of § 17(a),
which would include county judges among those subject to impeachment. This proposal is
in the best interests of the judiciary because it would provide uniformity and remove these
judges from the executive power of suspension provided in art. IV, § 7 of the constitution.
5. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I1, § 29 (1962); FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 29; FLA. CONST.
of 1865, art. VI, §§ 16-18; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. VI, §§ 16-18; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. VI,
§§ 20-22. The constitution of 1865, in art. IV, § 22, also provided for removal of officers "in
such manner as may be provided by law when no mode of trial or removal is provided in this
Constitution."
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men, who are also immune from the impeachment process.' Each
house of the legislature is the sole judge of the qualifications, elec-
tions, and returns of its members.7 And each house may punish or
expel a member under certain circumstances.' Other officers not
subject to impeachment may be suspended from office by the Gov-
ernor and thereafter reinstated or removed by the senate.'
The impeachment process provides the people with a degree of
needed protection from their government and serves as an effective
check on the ever-present temptation to misuse executive or judicial
power. Every officer who is subject to impeachment holds his office
subject to the authority of the legislature to investigate, charge, try,
and remove him. The knowledge that the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives has undertaken the investigation or consideration of im-
peachment in cases involving two governors, a lieutenant governor,
two state treasurers, a commissioner of education, three supreme
court justices, and four circuit judges should remove any doubt
about the willingness of the legislature to respond to charges of
misbehavior. 0 While the Florida Senate has never convicted a pub-
lic official after impeachment by the house of representatives, the
provisions for impeachment remain a critical part of the Florida
constitution and a vital factor in the governmental scheme.
It is self-evident that the impeachment powers may be abused.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cls. 1-2.
7. FLA. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
8. Id. § 4(d).
Rep. E. Bert Riddle was expelled from the house of representatives in 1961. FLA. H.R. JOUR.
2403 (Reg. Sess. 1961). In April, 1872, the senate expelled Senator Charles H. Pearce of the
Eight Senatorial District. See Dodd, "Bishop" Pearce and the Reconstruction of Leon
County, in APALACHEE 10 (1946).
For a discussion of legislative privileges and penalties, see A. MoRms, THE FLOiDA HAND-
BOOK 1977-1978, at 172 (16th ed. 1977).
9. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7. On July 12, 1976, Governor Reubin Askew asked the Florida
Supreme Court to answer questions relating to his constitutional duties in regard to the
suspension of local elected officials under consolidated government in Jacksonville. Specifi-
cally, the Governor wished to know whether the mayor of Jacksonville should be regarded as
a municipal officer or a county officer for purposes of art. IV, § 7 suspension and appointment,
or whether the mayor could be suspended under both § 7(a) and § 7(c). Section 7(a) allows
the Governor to remove county officials for "malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drun-
kenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform his official duties, or commission of
a felony. ... Section 7(c), on the other hand, allows the Governor to remove municipal
officials only if "indicted for crime." The court advised that the Governor's power to suspend
arose from § 7(a), relating to county officials, and not from § 7(c), relating to municipal
officials. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor Request of July 12, 1976, 336 So. 2d 97 (Fla.
1976). The court relied on Act of June 27, 1971, ch. 71-333, § 2, 1971 Fla. Laws 1514 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 112.49 [19771), which provides that an official of a consolidated government
"shall be deemed to be a county officer .... "
10. See A. MORRS, supra note 8, at 174-75. See also the discussions infra of specific
investigations and considerations.
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There is always the possibility that public emotions, political con-
siderations, or personal corruption will inspire legislative impeach-
ment activity. Indeed, there is some evidence that this was the case
when attempts were made to oust Governor Harrison Reed in 1868
and 1872."1 Justice Glenn Terrell, in a brief prepared for senate use
in 1957, characterized some of the charges against Judge James T.
Magbee of Tampa, filed in 1870, as "a little bit frivolous," one of
them being that he charged the cost of his stamps, pipes, and smok-
11. See J. WALLACE, CARPETBAG RULE IN FLORIDA, THE INSIDE WORKINGS OF THE RECON-
STRUCTION OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN FLORIDA AFTER THE CLOSE OF THE CIVIL WAR 158-59
(1888). Wallace, once a state senator from Leon County, wrote extensively on the political
overtones of the impeachment attempts against Governor Reed. The following excerpt from
his book illustrates the political corruption which he felt prompted these impeachment at-
tempts:
We now come to the last and most desperate attempt to get rid of Governor Reed
by impeachment. This time the farce was not conducted with even the faint sem-
blance of fairness which was displayed in the last attempt. The ring being outgener-
aled in their former attempts, were determined to conduct things on the ex parte
and Star Chamber plan. The resolution of the investigation did not mention the
name of Governor Reed, but State officials; and the less informed members of the
Legislature did not know what was going on. During the investigation, Republican
caucuses were held in the Assembly hall two and three times a week, and the state
of the country and the Republican party were fully discussed. Cessna, the chairman
of the Committee on Investigation, would be put forward to stir the blood of the
colored brother by singing "John Brown's body lies mouldering in the clay,"
"Sherman's March through Georgia," etc. While singing these songs Cessna could
imitate the plantation negro preacher in looks, voice and acts as no other carpet-
bagger could, and in many instances could put to shame the best negro minstrel.
These songs being considered old freedom songs, made Cessna very popular with
most of the colored members. Nothing would be said in the caucus with reference
to impeachment, but Purman would be on hand to denounce Reed and tell the
colored brother "if God would take Reed out of the way it would be better for them
and the Republican party." This argument, in connection with Cessna's songs, had
great effect on many of the colored members and on the less informed whites as
well. The most of the Democratic members at this session, as in the former session,
were in favor of impeachment, not because they believed Reed's traducers were
honest, but because they knew that every attempt at impeachment would
strengthen them and imperil honest Republicanism.
On the 6th of February, Cessna's investigating committee made its report, which
was loaded with numerous charges against Governor Reed. These charges sounded
so very damaging that some of the Governor's most intimate friends were deceived
by them and went to him and asked him to resign his office. The Governor said to
them that if the Legislature would give an [sic] half hour he would refute success-
fully every charge they had reported against him, and he felt perfectly confident
that he would be clearly exonerated, if he were allowed a hearing before the High
Court of Impeachment, in case he should be impeached by the Assembly. John R.
Scott, of Duval County, spoke in favor of Governor Reed, but afterwards, as was
prearranged, voted for the report for the usual consideration. The report was unani-
mously adopted, and Governor Reed stood suspended.
Id. For a more recent assessment, see J. SHOFNER, NOR IS IT OVER YET: FLORIDA IN THE ERA
OF RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1877, at 198-224 (1974).
IMPEACHMENT IN FLORIDA
ing tobacco to the senate." At best, impeachment is a slow, cumber-
some, and expensive procedure that is subject to abuse. Neverthe-
less, it remains an efficacious remedy by which the people, acting
through their elected representatives, can remove important and
politically powerful officials who violate the public trust.
This article consists of a review of the constitutional history of
impeachment, the alternate methods of removing impeachable offi-
cers, the grounds for impeachment, the effects of impeachment, and
the procedures involved in the investigation and trial of the officers,
as well as a discussion of the role of the judicial branch in this
process. Every Florida impeachment case is reviewed, as is every
Florida Supreme Court decision bearing on impeachment. The arti-
cle is designed as a comprehensive digest which the authors hope
will prove useful to participants in future impeachment proceed-
ings.
I. HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT AUTHORITY
Every constitution adopted in Florida has included an impeach-
ment section, and the provisions relative to impeachment within
those constitutions have been similar. 3
When Florida was still a territory preparing for statehood, the
constitution of 1838 was adopted. It provided that the Governor and
all civil officers 4 were liable for impeachment for misdemeanor in
office, that the house had exclusive authority to impeach, and that
the senate would conduct the trial and either convict or acquit the
impeached official. 5 The 1838 constitution and its impeachment
provisions continued in effect until 1861.
On January 11, 1861, a new constitution was adopted. Its preface
was the Ordinance of Seccession. m5 The people of Florida were gov-
12. Terrell, as Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, presided at the senate trial of
Circuit Judge George E. Holt, beginning July 8, 1957. Justice Terrell prepared and distrib-
uted to each senator a brief on impeachment which reviewed previous cases, discussed the
grounds for impeachment, and described the role of the senate in the impeachment process.
FLA. S, JOUR. 519-23 (Court of Impeachment 1957). When Justice E. Harris Drew presided
at the senate trial of Circuit Judge Richard Kelly in September, 1963, he included the Terrell
brief in a bound booklet that he provided for each senator.
13. See note 5 supra.
14. The early constitutional provisions were similar to those in the United States Consti-
tution. The phrase "all civil Officers" appears in art. II, § 4 of the United States Constitution.
The Florida constitution, however, omits the grounds of treason, bribery, and other high
crimes and misdemeanors which appear in the United States Constitution. Id. The only
ground stated in the Florida constitution is misdemeanor in office. FLA. CONST. art. III, §
17(a). See also provisions cited in note 5 supra.
15. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. VI, §§ 20-22.
16. FLA. CONST. of 1861.
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erned by this constitution throughout the Civil War, first as a sover-
eign nation and then as a Confederate state. The impeachment
provisions were the same as those contained in the earlier docu-
ment." The 1861 constitution and seccession ordinance were nulli-
fied by the convention of 1865.18
The 1865 constitution provided for a reorganized state govern-
ment under President Andrew Johnson's plan for reconstruction.',
Impeachment was provided for in article VI, sections 16-18. There
was also a section which authorized the removal of officers "in such
manner as might be provided by law, when no mode of trial or
removal is provided in this Constitution."20
The carpetbag constitution of 18681 superseded the 1865 version
and provided for a strong, centralized state government. It remained
effective until 1885. From 1868 to 1885, the impeachment powers
were used twice. 2 The 1868 document vested the sole power of im-
peachment in the assembly (house), and all cases were to be tried
by the senate.2 3 A two-thirds vote of assembly members present was
necessary to impeach, and two-thirds of the senators present were-
required to concur to obtain a conviction. The only ground specified
for impeachment was any misdemeanor in office. For the first time,
however, the constitution provided for the impeachment of specific
officers in addition to the Governor. These included the Lieutenant
Governor, members of the Cabinet, justices of the supreme court,
and judges of the circuit courts. All other officers appointed by the
Governor with the consent of the senate could be removed on the
recommendation of the Governor with the consent of the senate.
Other civil officers were subject to trial for misdemeanors in office
as the legislature provided by law. The 1868 document required the
chief justice to preside at all trials by impeachment unless he was
to be tried, in which case the Lieutenant Governor was to preside.
The constitution of 1885 generally continued the impeachment
17. Id. art. VI, §§ 16-18.
18. 25 FLA. STAT. ANN. 435 (Ordinances of Convention of 1865).
19. FA. CONST. of 1865, art. XVII.
20. Id. art. IV, § 22.
21. Reciting a chronology of important events in Florida's history, Allen Morris, in The
Florida Handbook 1977-1978, supra note 8, included:
1868 Faction-torn convention submitted new Constitution, given voter-
approval in May, which granted equal suffrage to races. Military rule ended, with
civil government formally resumed on July 4. State's political destinies were for the
time being in hands of those either new to Florida or new to the right to vote.
Id. at 284.
22. The Magbee and Reed impeachments took place under the 1868 constitution. Both
cases are discussed in text accompanying notes 73-79 infra.
23. FA. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 29.
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procedures found in the 1868 constitution. However, it referred to
the lower house as the house of representatives and required the
Governor to preside over the impeachment trial of the chief justice.'4
In 1962, the people adopted an amendment allowing the speaker of
the house of representatives to appoint a committee to investigate
alleged grounds for impeachment either during or between legisla-
tive sessions. 25 As originally adopted, the 1885 document contained
no provision for suspending or disqualifying an impeached officer
pending completion of the trial in the senate. Such a provision was
added by amendment in 1898.26
The omission of a suspension provision from the original 1885
constitution is surprising in light of the controversy over this point
generated by the impeachment of Governor Reed. In November,
1868, Reed sought an opinion from the Supreme Court of Florida as
to whether the number of legislators required to constitute a legally
valid legislature had assembled in response to a proclamation he
had issued.Y The Governor had called the legislature together for
specified purposes, and the assembly had ventured outside of his
call and voted articles of impeachment against him. Had the requi-
site number of members been assembled to make the legislative
session valid, Reed would have been powerless even to seek the
opinion of the justices. For, under the provisions of the 1868 consti-
tution, he would have been automatically disqualified to act as
governor and, in fact, under arrest.28 The court advised that both
houses must have a quorum present for there to be a valid legisla-
24. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. M, § 29.
25. The amendment was proposed by Fla. HJR 1730 (1961), 1961 Fla. Laws 1170, and
adopted by the voters at the general election of November 6, 1962. The 1957 legislature found
that the investigation, preparation of articles, and debate in the house of representatives
involving Circuit Judge George Holt demanded much time and energy of the members. The
journal entries reflect that committee members were excused from many sessions. Author
Karl, then a member of the house, personally observed that the activity interfered with the
business of the regular session. The proposal to allow an investigation between sessions was
probably made in reaction to the Holt situation. The investigations conducted in 1974 and
1975, discussed below, proved the wisdom of this amendment.
26. The provision appeared in FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, § 34 (1898), and provided:
Immediately upon the impeachment of any officer by the House of Representa-
tives, he shall be disqualified from performing any of the duties of his office until
acquitted by the Senate, and the Governor in such case shall at once appoint an
incumbent to fill such office pending the impeachment proceedings. In case of the
impeachment of the Governor, the President of the Senate, or in case of death,
resignation or inability of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall act as Governor, pending the impeachment proceedings
against the Governor.
Id.
27. In re Executive Commun. of the 9th of Nov., A.D. 1868, 12 Fla. 653 (1868).
28. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 15; id. art. XVI, § 9.
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ture. Since there was less than a quorum in the senate, there was
no valid legislative session and the Governor was not impeached. 9
The constitution of 1968 provides for impeachment in article III,
section 17.3 The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, members of the
Cabinet, justices of the supreme court, judges of the district courts
of appeal, and judges of the circuit courts are liable to impeachment
for misdemeanor in office. The house is given the power to impeach,
and the speaker of the house is allowed to appoint a committee at
any time to investigate charges against any officer subject to im-
peachment.3'
Under the current constitution, when an officer has been im-
peached by the house, he is disqualified from performing any official
duties, and the Governor may appoint a person to perform those
duties until the completion of the trial.3 2 If the Governor is im-
peached, the Lieutenant Governor assumes the duties of the office
of Governor pending the outcome of the trial.33
The house of representatives, by two-thirds vote, has the sole
power to impeach an officer, and he cannot be convicted unless two-
thirds of the senators present concur.34 The clemency power of the
29. In re Executive Commun. of the 9th of Nov., A.D. 1868, 12 Fla. 653 (1868).
30. In 1966 and 1967, a constitution revision commission prepared a draft of a revision of
most of the articles. The legislature, in its regular session of 1967, made changes in the draft
presented by the commission and caused the revised version to be placed on the ballot at the
general election in November, 1968. The people adopted the revised constitution in 1968 by
a vote of 645,233 for it and 518,940 against it. A. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 638. Article V, the
judicial article, was not revised until 1972.
FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2, provides for a commission to review and recommend revision of
the constitution beginning in the tenth year after adoption. Pursuant to the opinion of a
majority of the supreme court in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 343 So. 2d 17 (Fla.
1977), the commission was appointed in June and July of 1977, only eight and one-half years
after adoption of the constitution.
Attached to this article is an appendix containing the proposed revisions to articles III, IV,
and V which related to the subjects discussed herein and which have been approved by the
Constitution Revision Commission as of the publication deadline.
31. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(a).
32. Id. § 17(b).
33. Id. art. IV, § 3(b).
34. In specifying the vote necessary for conviction in an impeachment trial by the senate,
art. III, § 17(c), requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the senators present. In art. III, §
17(a), however, the required vote for impeachment by the house is stated simply as two-
thirds, with no mention of whether the measure is of the total membership or of the members
present. The 1885 and 1868 constitutions were specific on this point, permitting impeachment
by a vote of two-thirds of the members present. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, § 29; FLA. CONST.
of 1868, art. IV, § 29. Article X, § 12(e) of the 1968 constitution seems to indicate that the
two-thirds vote specified in art. III, § 17(a) means two-thirds of the members present: "§ 12
Rules of Construction. . . . (e) Vote or other action of a legislative house or other governmen-
tal body means the vote or action of a majority or other specified percentage of those members
voting on the matter." [Emphasis added.]
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Governor does not apply where impeachment results in conviction. 5
Under article III, section 17(c), all impeachment cases are tried
by the senate with the chief justice or another justice designated by
him presiding. If the chief justice is the impeached officer, the Gov-
ernor presides. The senate may sit for the trial of an impeachment
case whether or not the house of representatives is in session. 3 It
may determine the time for the trial of any impeachment, but the
trial must not be more than six months after the impeachment.37
When sitting as a court of impeachment, the authority of the senate
is restricted to the trial and administrative matters related to the
trial. 38 It cannot consider other matters.
II. EFFECTS OF IMPEACHMENT
An officer impeached by the house of representatives is disquali-
fied from performing any official duties of his office until he is
acquitted by the senate. 39 To constitute an effective impeachment
and suspension from office under the constitution, the articles of
impeachment must be presented to the senate, and a constitutional
quorum of the senate must receive them.'0 Chief Justice Randall
wrote in 1868 that an impeachment is not merely the adoption of a
resolution containing articles of impeachment, but also is the actual
announcement and declaration of impeachment by the house,
through its committee, to the senate that it does thereby impeach
the officer accused. 4' Justice Randall likened the process of im-
peachment to proceedings by indictment in that an indictment is
of no effect until "presented to the court in actual, open, and legal
session, and received and filed therein. 4 2 Thus, he reasoned:
35. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a).
36. The senate may also convene by act of its president or by a majority of its membership
to consider removing or reinstating officers suspended by the Governor who are not subject
to impeachment. Id. § 7(b).
37. The constitution does not say what the status of the impeached officer would be if
the senate failed to begin the trial within the six-month period. Such a provision has been in
Florida's constitution since 1885, and the senate has not acted in a manner which could cause
dispute over the consequences of delay.
The 1868 constitution gave the impeached officer the right to demand trial within one year,
but that was never tested. In In re Executive Commun. Filed the 17th Day of April, A.D.
1872, 14 Fla. 289, 292 (1872), the court, in determining the effect of the senate adjournment
on Governor Reed's impeachment, said, "IFlor whatever may be the effect of the expiration
of one year from the impeachment and demand for trial, that time has not elapsed, and for
that reason the construction of that clause of the constitution is not here involved."
38. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 156 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1963).
39. FLA. CONST. art. lII, § 17(b).
40. In re Executive Commun. of the 9th of Nov.-, A.D. 1868, 12 Fla. 653 (1868).
41. Id. at 677.
42. Id. at 678.
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In the light of the abundant precedents and authorities on the
subject, under constitutional provisions precisely like our own in
that respect, we cannot . . . so far deviate from established princi-
ples, rules, and beaten paths as to recognize a declaratory resolu-
tion of the Assembly as constituting an effective impeachment,
until the declaration of impeachment or the accusation be made
to and at the bar of the only tribunal authorized by the Constitu-
tion to receive and act upon it.43
During the regular session of 1872, in its second attempt, the
assembly succeeded in impeaching Governor Reed." The senate,
sitting as a court of impeachment, adjourned without conducting
his trial. Because the Lieutenant Governor had assumed the duties
of the office of governor upon Reed's impeachment by the assembly,
the Governor asked the supreme court whether the senate's adjourn-
ment constituted his acquittal for purposes of article 16, section 9
of the 1868 constitution. If so, then he would no longer have been
disqualified from exercising the powers of the office of Governor.
The court advised that the adjournment neither reinstated the Gov-
ernor nor lifted his disqualification . 5 Relative to what is meant by
acquittal by the senate, the court said:
What is the true intent and meaning of the word acquittal as
here used in the constitution? The court does not differ as to the
proper definition of this term. It is our unanimous opinion that it
is not restricted to an actual judgment of acquittal after vote, upon
full evidence failing to convict, by a requisite two-thirds of the
members of an organized Senate. We think its true signification
embraces any affirmative final action by a legal Senate other than
a conviction, by which it dismisses or discontinues the prosecution.
Any final disposition of the impeachment matter by the Senate,
the Chief Justice presiding, other than a conviction, is therefore an
acquittal for the purpose of removing the disqualification from
performing the duties of the office. Whether it is effective for any
other purpose, is not here involved."
The senate had not acted on any motion to discharge Reed or ac-
quitted him; it had simply adjourned. Thus, the court concluded
that the Governor's case was still pending.
One additional effect of impeachment is worth noting. Although
43. Id.
44. FLA. Ass. JOUR. 263 (Reg. Sess. 1872).
45. In re Executive Commun. Filed the 17th Day of April, A.D. 1872, 14 Fla. 289 (1872).
46. Id. at 292-93.
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apparently neither statute nor constitution nor judicial precedent
provides for suspension of payment of compensation upon impeach-
ment, the general practice has been to disallow compensation from
the date the articles of impeachment are presented to the senate.47
However, if the impeached official is acquitted, he is given back pay
for the period of his suspension."
III. GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT
Every version of the Florida constitution has provided for im-
peachment for the commission of "misdemeanor in office."4 These
seemingly simple words have bred controversy in every impeach-
ment case. They render uncertain the very scope of impeachment,
47. See 1957 FLA. Op. Arr'y GEN. 057-137.
The Florida House of Representatives is presently proceeding against Judge Samuel Smith,
Circuit Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit. Questions have arisen as to whether Judge Smith,
who has been determined to be indigent, is entitled to counsel provided by the house of
representatives in matters directly related to proceedings before a committee on impeach-
ment, and whether the house of representatives runs the risk of inadvertently granting im-
munity to an officer subject to impeachment who may also be the subject of state criminal
prosecution by compelling his attendance by subpoena or by compelling the production of
books, papers, or other documents by subpoena duces tecum in the absence of appointed
counsel.
These questions were addressed to the attorney general of Florida by Representatives
Donald Tucker and William J. Rish. By letter dated March 16, 1978, #078-48, the attorney
general responded that nothing in the federal or Florida constitutions, Florida Statutes, or
decisional law required the authorization of state funds to provide counsel to an officer under
impeachment investigation by the house of representatives; that this view is reinforced by
the fact that the role of the house of representatives is of a preliminary and investigative
nature; and that the right to assistance or appearance of counsel is distinguishable from the
right to have counsel provided at government expense. As to the question of immunity from
prosecution, the attorney general cited to his earlier opinion, 1973 FLA. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 073-
150, and explained:
"[O]nly the state, acting through its prosecuting attorney, can immunize a witness
under said statute." In AGO 075-219, I considered the question of whether a legisla-
tive committee could grant immunity from criminal prosecution. I concluded in
AGO 075-219, and here reiterate, that "[an examination of Florida Statutes fails
to disclose any statute authorizing a legislative committee to grant immunity from
prosecution to a witness appearing before it, and in the absence of such a statute,
no legal power to grant immunity exists." (e.s.) In accord is AGO 060-168, constru-
ing former §932.29, F.S., the predecessor of current §914.04, F.S. As to your sugges-
tion that immunity might "inadvertently" be granted, I would emphasize that,
since it is clear that a legislative committee is not empowered to grant immunity
from criminal prosecution, any objection to testifying or producing documents in-
terposed by the officer, grounded on a claim of self-incrimination, must be re-
spected. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 31 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).
1978 FLA. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 078-48, at 10.
48. This is evidenced by the cases of Judge Kelly and Judge Holt, discussed infra, Letter
from Ray Green, Comptroller of Florida, to Judge Richard Kelly (Sept. 27, 1963) (on file with
Florida Judicial Administrative Commission).
49. See FLA. CONST. art. I1, § 17; note 5 supra.
12 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and they give great import to the definition of the word
"misdemeanor." As used in impeachment matters, "misdemeanor"
has come to have a much broader meaning than the traditional
"misdemeanor" defined and applied in criminal procedure at com-
mon law.5"
This historic debate over what constitutes an impeachable offense
is not peculiar to Florida. The same issue would logically be in-
volved in every impeachment proceeding under the United States
Constitution, which has always provided that the President, Vice
President, and all civil officers "shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors."'" Justice Joseph Story argued in
his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States that the
Constitution authorized impeachment only for those acts contem-
plated by the English parliamentary law as it existed in 1787. Other-
wise, he insisted, the issue would be left to the arbitrary discretion
of the Senate. In Story's view:
Resort . . .must be had either to parliamentary practice, and the
common law, in order to ascertain, what are high crimes and mis-
demeanours; or the whole subject must be left to the arbitrary
discretion of the senate, for the time being. The latter is so incom-
patible with the genius of our institutions, that no lawyer or states-
man would be inclined to countenance so absolute a despotism of
opinion and practice, which might make that a crime at one time,
or in one person, which would be deemed innocent at another time,
or in another person. The only safe guide in such cases must be the
common law, which is the guardian at once of private rights and
public liberties. And however much it may fall in with the political
theories of certain statesmen and jurists, to deny the existence of
a common law belonging to, and applicable to the nation in ordi-
nary cases, no one has as yet been bold enough to assert, that the
power of impeachment is limited to offences positively defined in
the statute book of the Union, as impeachable high crimes and
misdemeanours.
52
Even so, in April, 1970, when then Congressman Gerald R. Ford
proposed the impeachment of Justice William 0. Douglas of the
United States Supreme Court, he maintained that an impeachable
offense is simply what the House, with the concurrence of the Sen-
50. In re Investigation of Circuit Judge, 93 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1957).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. For a discussion of the meaning of the constitutional language,
see R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973).
52. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTmON OF THE UNITED STATES § 795 (1833).
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ate, considers it to be. 3
In a 1936 article entitled The Law of Impeachment, Judge George
H. Ethridge of the Supreme Court of Mississippi discussed what he
termed the judicial versus the political theory of impeachment. 4
Relative to the judicial theory, he said that the law defines offenses
for impeachment and proceeds on notice with all due process rights
accorded. In contrast, the political theory contemplates a proceed-
ing in which a person may be tried for anything that is offensive to
the ideals of the triers-anything which, in their judgment, evi-
dences unfitness for holding office, whether connected with official
conduct or not and whether or not specified in constitution or stat-
ute. According to Ethridge, the judicial theory assures the rule of
reason. Passion is suppressed. Justice is the goal. The political
theory, on the other hand, allows passion to rule. Reason is sup-
pressed. Political victory is the goal.
In practice in Florida, the committee appointed by the speaker
of the house to investigate charges made against an impeachable
officer is the first to face the question of whether the charges, if true,
constitute an impeachable offense."5 The committee need not deter-
mine the guilt or innocence of the officer involved but should find
probable cause before reporting in favor of impeachment." The rec-
ommendation of the committee to the full house of representatives
brings on the next and first major test of whether the alleged facts
qualify as an impeachable offense. 7 If it finds probable cause, the
committee drafts articles of impeachment for consideration by the
house.58
53. What, then is an impeachable offense?
The only honest answer is that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of
the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history;
conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body
considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office.
116 CONG. REc. 11913 (1970).
54. 8 Miss. L.J. 283 (1936).
55. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(a).
56. See Fla. H.R., Select Committee on Impeachment, I transcript of proceedings at 3-6
(Feb. 25, 1975) (on file with House Judiciary Committee, State Legislative Library, and State
Archives).
57. If the committee concludes that there is no probable cause or that the action of the
official does not amount to an impeachable offense, the question before the house is whether
to investigate further, appoint a new committee, or adopt the committee recommendation
and close the case. In the 1951 session, articles of impeachment were introduced against
Governor Fuller Warren. The committee decided that the grounds were legally insufficient
for impeachment. The house agreed. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1478-80 (Reg. Sess. 1951). See also note
71 infra.
58. For example, the special committee of the house appointed to investigate Treasurer
and Insurance Commissioner Thomas O'Malley in 1975 acknowledged its responsibility to
report to the full house and included proposed articles of impeachment in its report. FLA. H.R.
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If the constitutionally required two-thirds vote favoring impeach-
ment is attained, it may be concluded that the house believes that
the articles describe an impeachable offense or offenses. If the vote
falls short of the requirement, the conclusion is not so clear. Some
members may believe that the facts charged, even if proven, do not
constitute an impeachable offense. Others may feel that such facts
would be grounds for impeachment but that sufficient proof has not
been presented. No member is required to explain his vote, although
some do.59
Historically when articles of impeachment have been presented
by the house managers to the senate, the impeached officer has
challenged their legal sufficiency by a motion. 0 This tradition di-
rectly confronts the members with the question of whether the
JOUR. 1052 (Reg. Sess. 1975). See also FLA. H.R. JouR. 617 (Reg. Sess. 1973) (report of the
committee investigating Lieutenant Governor Tom Adams).
59. E.g., Letter from Rep. F. Charles Usina to Speaker Doyle E. Conner, reprinted in FLA.
H.R. JouR. 1726 (Reg. Sess. 1957); Explanation of Vote on House Resolution No. 1942 by
Reps. Thomas M. Carney and Frederick B. Karl, FLA. H.R. JouR. 1728 (Reg. Sess. 1957).
60. E.g., FLA. S. JOUR. 15 (Court of Impeachment 1963); FLA. S. JOUR. 11 (Court of
Impeachment 1957). An example of such a motion follows:
MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISMISS ARTICLE
OF IMPEACHMENT
COMES NOW GEORGE E. HOLT, the respondent herein, appearing in propria
persona and by counsel undersigned, and respectfully moves the honorable Senate
of the State of Florida, sitting as a court of impeachment, to enter an order striking
the article of impeachment, dismissing the proceedings, and discharging the res-
pondent upon the following grounds:
1. The single article of impeachment fails to charge misdemeanor in office within
the purview and meaning of Article 3, Section 29, of the Constitution of Florida in
that it fails to charge this respondent with the violation of any duty imposed by
law.
2. The article of impeachment aforesaid fails to charge respondent with an im-
peachable offense under the laws and the Constitution of Florida.
3. The article of impeachment aforesaid is so vague, ambiguous, indefinite and
uncertain in terms, and constructed in such general, loose, and uninformative alle-
gations and unsupported conclusions of the pleader as to embarrass, impede and
prejudice the respondent in the preparation of a proper defense thereto, and there-
fore deprives respondent of fundamental rights secured to him under Sections 11
and 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution and as guaranteed
to him by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
4. The purported specifications, (a) to (f), and each and all of them, designated
as the basis for impeachment, fail to show or allege a violation of a duty imposed
on this respondent as a Circuit Judge, either under the common law or any statu-
tory or constitutional law of the State of Florida.
5. To remove this respondent from the office to which he was appointed in the
year 1941 and to which he has been re-elected by the voters on two successive
occasions upon the basis of the vague and unsupported conclusions set forth in the
article would violate Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of
Florida and would deprive respondent of his right to office without due process of
law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
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charges, if proven, constitute an impeachable offense. Again, in
passing on subsequent motions and finally voting for either convic-
tion or acquittal, the senate is forced to decide the sufficiency of the
grounds.
At each step along the way, the legislators are provided with
advice from committee counsel or counsel for the house managers
as well as counsel for the officer under attack." Oral arguments are
presented by both sides-except during house debate, in which only
members speak-and the person presiding at the trial in the senate
announces his understanding of the law.62 This discussion by the
chief justice or other presiding person serves merely to guide the
senate and is not binding.
Review of the legislative history of impeachment in Florida and
the articles of impeachment proposed in individual cases discloses
a variety of grounds for impeachment, as may be seen from the
analysis later in this article of the grounds determined by the house
of representatives to be impeachable offenses in each of the cases
which has come before it.
The Supreme Court of Florida has addressed the question of
grounds for impeachment only a few times. 3 In 1974, in Forbes v.
Earle, the court, through Justice Ben Overton, stated that "[tihe
determination of what is an impeachable offense is the responsibil-
ity of the legislature."6 As for the power of the speaker of the house
to appoint committees to investigate charges against impeachable
officers, 5 the court observed that "[a] reasonable reading of the
provision clearly does not contemplate a broad brush investigation
of the class of officers subject to impeachment." 6 Thus, while the
impeachment power is peculiarly a legislative power, it is not with-
out constraint or limitation.
Perhaps the most helpful opinion of the supreme court on the
subject of grounds for impeachment is In re Investigation of A Cir-
cuit Judge, authored by Chief Justice Terrell in 1957.7 In that opin-
ion, the court first announced the proposition that the house of
representatives, because it possesses the sole power of impeach-
61. See, e.g., FLA. S. JOUR. 17-34 (Court of Impeachment 1963); FLA. S. JOUR. 37-40 (Court
of Impeachment 1957).
62. See, e.g., FLA. S. JouR. 510, 519-23 (Court of Impeachment 1957).
63. For further discussion of judicial review, see JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS infra.
64. 298 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1974) (footnote omitted). Justice Overton did, however, suggest
that a violation of judicial ethical canons may not be an impeachable offense. Id. at 3 n.4.
65. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(a).
66. 298 So. 2d at 5.
67. 93 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1957).
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ment, has the sole power to determine whether the charges brought
amount to a misdemeanor in office within the meaning of the consti-
tution. The court examined the phrase "misdemeanor in office" and
stated that it
may include any act involving moral turpitude which is contrary
to justice, honesty, principles, or good morals, if performed by
virtue or authority of office. "Misdemeanor in office" is synony-
mous with misconduct in office and is broad enough to embrace
any wilful malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. It
may not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent . . . . In
Words and Phrases, citing Yoe v. Hoffman, supra, it was said that
the phrase "Misdemeanor In Office," when referring to impeach-
ment should be applied in the parliamentary sense and when so
applied it means misconduct in office. Something which amounts
to a breach of the conditions tacitly annexed to the office, and
includes any wrongful official act or omission to perform an official
duty.""
Finally, in deciding not to determine whether the charges in the
particular case constituted "misdemeanor in office," the court said
that "that will be determined by the House of Representatives if
impeachment proceedings are brought." '
Thus, an act must amount to "a breach of the conditions tacitly
annexed to the office" to result in impeachment. These words are
not, however, limited to wrongful official acts or omitted perform-
ance of an official duty. Indeed, in his brief to the senate in the Holt
impeachment trial, Justice Terrell himself embraced a much
broader view of grounds for impeachment. According to Terrell's
brief:
The law writers generally hold that while the offense must be
committed during incumbency in office, it need not be committed
under color of office. An act or a course of misbehavior which
renders scandalous the personal life of a public officer, shakes the
confidence of the people in his administration of public affairs and
impairs his official usefulness, although it may not directly affect
his official integrity, may be characterized as a high crime or mis-
demeanor . . .o
Thus, neither legislative nor judicial precedent puts to rest the
68. Id. at 606.
69. Id. at 607.
70. FLA. S. JOUR. 520 (Court of Impeachment 1957).
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question of what constitutes an impeachable offense.7 Likewise,
there are no limiting provisions in the constitution which shed light
on the question. We can expect that, as future house committees are
appointed to investigate charges against an impeachable officer, the
attorneys involved will study the question again and inundate house
and senate members with arguments and briefs supporting their
respective views on grounds for impeachment.72 The legislature will
have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the alleged conduct
of the officer involved is sufficient to warrant impeachment. In the
end, each member will undoubtedly follow his or her own conscience
about the sufficiency of the charges in any particular case.
The following is a listing of all the articles of impeachment which
have been presented to the Florida House of Representatives. For
the most part, these articles were all adopted by the house. Al-
though no convictions have resulted, in some instances probable
convictions have been avoided only by resort to resignation. The
various impeachment articles illustrate the vast variety of activities
which have been considered impeachable offenses in Florida.
Judge James T. Magbee
The first impeachment proceeding in Florida occurred in 1870 and
involved Circuit Judge James T. Magbee, against whom five articles
of impeachment were voted:
Article I-He caused one Henderson to come before his court and
fined Henderson $100 under the pretext of contempt for writing and
publishing an article criticizing a speech delivered by Magbee. He
unlawfully detained and imprisoned Henderson until the fine was
71. The house missed an excellent opportunity to establish precedent on the legal suffi-
ciency of articles of impeachment in 1951, in connection with the proposed impeachment of
Governor Fuller Warren. Articles were introduced and referred to a special committee to
determine their legal sufficiency. The committee, chaired by Rep. Woodrow Melvin, reported
on each article, stating that it failed to charge misdemeanor in office. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1479
(Reg. Sess. 1951). The full house accepted the committee report and postponed indefinitely
further consideration of the resolution containing the charges. Id. at 1480. Then, on the
motion of Rep. Thomas D. Beasley, the house voted to expunge from the record everything
except the title to the resolution, thereby leaving the entire incident without precedential
value. Id.
For information purposes, we note the Fuller Warren impeachment articles are located in
the Fuller Warren Papers location U35, Robert M. Strozier Library, Florida State University.
Both the house and senate would be well advised to include in their respective libraries
the legislative publications from the Watergate era involving the Nixon impeachment: HousE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS (Comm.
Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS].
72. See, e.g., Fla. H.R. Select Committee on Impeachment, I transcript of proceedings
(Feb. 25, 1975) (on file with House Judiciary Committee, State Legislative Library, and State
Archives).
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paid when in fact Henderson's article was published when Magbee's
court was not in session and Henderson was not in contempt.
Article II-He unlawfully removed two grand jurors from the
panel regularly drawn and caused the names of two petit jurors
drawn on the regular panel of petit jurors to be placed on the panel
of grand jurors in their stead, thereby committing a misdemeanor.
Article HI-Prior to the drawing of grand and petit jurors for the
fall term of 1869, he unlawfully attempted to induce and influence
the Clerk of the Circuit Court to commit fraud in drawing the grand
and petit jurors for the fall term in that he asked the clerk not to
place the names of certain jurors, if drawn, upon the jury list and,
instead, to place the names of certain other persons on the list,
whether drawn or not, thereby committing a misdemeanor.
Article IV-He purchased pipes, tobacco, envelopes, stamps, and
other articles for his own private use and unlawfully caused these
articles to be charged as "stationery" against the State.
Article V-He persuaded Irene Jenkins, charged with adultery,
that a plea of guilty would induce a mitigation of the penalty,
whereupon she entered a plea of guilty. Magbee, disregarding his
promise, imposed cruel and unusual punishment, to wit, twenty-one
months' imprisonment at hard labor, while at the same time, Louis
M. Jenkins, charged with the same offense, plead guilty and was
fined only $75. By such acts he manifested a cruel and wicked dispo-
sition of heart and an incompetency for the position of judge.73
While his case was pending, Magbee resigned his office.7" On Jan-
uary 11, 1871, the Court of Impeachment reconvened, at which time
the managers from the assembly appeared and moved that the case
be dismissed. The resolution to adopt the managers' motion was
approved, and the chief justice discharged Magbee from the custody
of the High Court and adjourned sine die.75
Governor Harrison Reed
The house twice attempted to impeach Governor Harrison Reed.
The first attempt failed for lack of a quorum of the senate in 1868.76
However, in 1872, the assembly succeeded in passing the following
articles of impeachment against Governor Reed:
Article I-He signed state bonds in the amount of $528,000 in
73. FLA. Ass. JoUR. 353-55 (Reg. Sess. 1870).
74. K. GRISMER, TAMPA: A HISTORY OF THE CITY OF TAMPA AND THE TAMPA BAY REGION OF
FLORIDA 156 (1950).
75. FLA. S. JOUR. 55-57 (Reg. Sess. 1871).
76. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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excess of the amount authorized to be issued by an act of the legisla-
ture with intent to violate that act.
Article II-He fraudulently conspired to issue state bonds in the
amount of $1,000,000 for the purchase of stock of the Florida, Atlan-
tic, and Gulf Central Railroad Company for the use and benefit of
private persons, in collusion with such persons, and for his own
pecuniary advantage.
Article III-He signed his official signature as Governor to those
bonds in the amount of $1,000,000.
Article IV-He caused to be issued and signed his name to state
bonds in the amount of $4,000,000 for the use and benefit of the
Jacksonville, Pensacola & Mobile Railroad Company, having full
notice of the fraudulent title of that company to the property of the
Pensacola and Georgia and Tallahassee Railroads.
(Articles V and VI were stricken).
Article VII-He fraudulently conspired with one Milton S. Little-
field and others to embezzle monies received from the hypotheca-
tion of state bonds and embezzled $22,000 from those monies.
Article VIII-He received $3,500 from Littlefield to influence his
official action in sustaining the claim of the Jacksonville, Pensacola
& Mobile Railroad Company to the title of property of the Pensacola
& Georgia and Tallahassee and Florida, Atlantic and Gulf Central
Railroads.
Article IX-He conspired with one Charles Pond and one E.B.
Buckley to defraud the state of $15,000 of state bonds and did so
defraud the state.
Article X-He received from one I.K. Roberts, on behalf of Flor-
ida Railroad Company, a draft for $1,140 which was paid to him in
United States currency and tendered script of the state in lieu of
that currency to the state treasurer.
Article XI-He conspired to influence a justice of the peace in the
exercise of his judicial action on a case pending before him.
Article XII-He conspired with one Aaron Barnett to prostitute
his official influence, in receiving $10,000 from Barnett for his offi-
cial sanction and signature to a contract of conveyance of internal
improvement lands to Barnett.
Article XIII-He unlawfully appropriated monies ($6,948.63) be-
longing to the state, placed in his possession by one Westcott, and
received by him as trustee, viz., he substituted for those monies
certain securities of the state purchased by him at a large discount.
Article XIV-He embezzled state money ($1,897.24) in the pos-
session of the secretary of state for his own use, benefit, and pur-
poses.
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Article XV-He unlawfully appropriated $11,000 of the contin-
gent fund appropriated by the legislature for his own personal use
and benefit.
Article XVI-He wrongfully and maliciously falsified his official
acts and doings to one T.W. Brevard for the purpose of affecting the
interests of certain persons to the detriment of the public interest.77
The senate organized as a court but adjourned without trial dur-
ing the regular session. Acting Governor Samuel T. Day issued a
proclamation convening the legislature in extraordinary session.
During that session, Reed filed a motion for acquittal and discharge
through an ally in the senate. This motion was passed, and the chief
justice declared that as a legal consequence of the adoption of the
motion, Reed was discharged from custody. Several senators intro-
duced a protest against the discharge and spread it upon the jour-
nal., Governor Reed served out the rest of his term and later served
in the Florida House of Representatives."9
Treasurer Clarence B. Collins
State Treasurer Clarence B. Collins was impeached in 1897 for the
following offenses:
Article I-He provided a $15,000 loan to Merchants National
Bank of Ocala out of the general funds and public revenues of the
State of Florida.
Article II-He made the $15,000 loan to Merchants National
Bank knowing that the bank was insolvent.
Article HII-He provided a $15,000 deposit out of general funds
and public revenues as a special time deposit in the National Bank
of the State of Florida at Jacksonville.
Article IV-He provided a $15,000 loan out of the general funds
and public revenues to the Marion County, Florida, school board.
Article V-He loaned $3,000 from the general fund and public
revenues to the Board of Public Instruction of Citrus County.
Article VI-He paid $15,000 of public funds to R.B. McConnell
without warrant of law.
Article VII-He provided $10,000 from the general fund and pub-
lic revenues to invest in enterprises not for the use and purposes of
the State of Florida and not authorized by law.
Article VIII-He deposited $254,124.32 out of the general fund
77. FLA. Ass. JouR. 257-63, 303-05 (Reg. Sess. 1872).
78. FLA. S. JOUR. 68, 73 (Extraord. Sess. 1872). See also note 11 supra.
79. A. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 119.
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and public revenue in various banks, with totally inadequate secu-
rity.
Article IX-He exhibited a trial balance sheet at the close of
business for April 30, 1897, in the amount of $343,127.39 when only
$341,387.39 was on hand.
Article X-On May 8, 1897, he was unlawfully short in his ac-
counts as treasurer in the amount of $50,981.37.
Article XI-He made and caused to be made fictitious and irregu-
lar entries on the books belonging to the treasurer's office pertaining
to the general fund and public revenues.
Article XII-With intent to deceive, he reported to the Governor
that there was no money of the general fund and public revenues in
the Merchants National Bank of Ocala when in fact there was
$32,927.01 .8
Pursuant to authorization by the house,"' the managers supple-
mented the twelve original articles of impeachment against Collins
with the following nine additional articles:
Article I-He converted $15,710.96 of the tax redemption fund for
the quarter ending June 30, 1896, to his own use and did not pay
any portion thereof into the state treasury until April, 1897, when
he paid $11,321.58, leaving a deficit of $4,389.38.
Article II-He converted $10,863.16 of the state tax redemption
fund for the quarter ending September 30, 1896, to his own use.
Article III-He converted $6,817.16 of the state tax redemption
fund for the quarter ending December 31, 1896, to his own use.
Article IV-Without authority of law, and contrary to the stat-
utes, he loaned $32,927.01 out of the general fund and public reve-
nues to Merchants National Bank of Ocala.
Article V-Without authority of law, and contrary to the statutes,
he loaned $39,962.11 to the Capital City Bank of Tallahassee from
the general fund and public revenues.
Article VI-Without authority of law, and contrary to the stat-
utes, he loaned $15,800.84 to the National Bank of the State of
Florida from the general fund and public revenues.
Article VII-Without authority of law, and contrary to the stat-
utes, he loaned First National Bank of Pensacola the sum of
$6,106.07 from the general fund and public revenues.
Article VIII-Without authority of law, and contrary to the stat-
utes, he loaned $11,094.17 to the First National Bank of Tallahassee
from the general fund and public revenues.
80. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 805-11 (Reg. Sess. 1897).
81. Id. at 883-84.
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Article IX-He unlawfully, willfully, and falsely, with intent to
deceive, reported to the Governor that the state tax redemption
fund for April, 1897, amounted to $6,557.30 and that $3,000 of that
sum had been paid in a Citrus County school warrant. This report
was false in that $3,000 was not paid to him in the shape of a
warrant but was paid in currency and other current funds.82
Having been advised by the Governor that Collins had resigned,
the house, on June 4, 1897, adopted a resolution withdrawing the
articles of impeachment and notifying the senate of the action."
Collins held no other statewide, elective public office after his resig-
nation.
Governor Fuller Warren
In 1951 a resolution was introduced to impeach Governor Fuller
Warren. A special committee appointed to review the charges found
that none of them stated a misdemeanor in office and recommended
that they not pass. The house agreed, and further consideration of
the matter was indefinitely postponed. All the articles, with the
exception of the title, were thereafter expunged from the record,
thereby making them unavailable for review.84
Warren served out the rest of his term. He ran for the Democratic
gubernatorial nomination in 1956 but was soundly defeated. 5
Judge George E. Holt
Circuit Judge George E. Holt of Dade County was impeached in
1957 for allegedly bringing disrepute and scandal to his court by
accepting gifts from attorneys practicing before his court, permit-
ting personal relationships with individuals to improperly influence
his judicial appointments and allowances of fees to such appointees,
borrowing money from an attorney practicing before his court,
awarding excessive and unnecessary fees, and flagrantly violating
the Judicial Code of Ethics. 6 Judge Holt was subsequently acquit-
ted. 7 He later left the bench without ever serving in any higher
judicial office in Florida.
82. FLA. S. JOUR. 933-38 (Reg. Sess. 1897).
83. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1309 (Reg.'Sess. 1897).
84. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1465, 1478-80 (Reg. Sess. 1951). See note 71 supra.
85. See A. MoaRms, supra note 8, at 496.
86. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1689 (Reg. Sess. 1957).




During the same session the house sought to impeach Circuit
Judge Vincent Giblin of Dade County on the following grounds:
Article I-He lent the dignity, name, and standing of his office
to a political candidate in the November, 1956, general election and
made a political speech endorsing the candidacy of L.C. Proby for
circuit judge.
Article II-He became patently intoxicated at a Miami Beach Bar
Association function to the point of "passing out."
Article III-He lent his name and the dignity of his office to a
commercially operated radio station by personal appearances before
the broadcasting microphones on a question-and-answer program.
Article IV-He uttered and caused to be published and dissemi-
nated, intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous accusations and
charges against judges of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit.
Article V-He publicly announced and published that he would
refuse to wear the officially required robe of his office because, he
claimed, the robe had been defiled and dishonored by other judges
of the same court, thereby ridiculing and degrading his associates.
Article VI-In the company of a radio commentator, he went to
the home of an incompetent ward of the circuit court, knowing that
an associate judge had jurisdiction over the incompetent, to conduct
a private interview with the ward without regard for the upsetting
effect on the ward. Thereafter, he publicly charged that the incom-
petent was being held a "virtual prisoner of the Court" and that the
order of the judge appointing the guardian was void. He thereby
impugned, ridiculed, and degraded an associate judge.
Article VII-His continuous conduct, consisting of public appear-
ances and utterances and other improper acts, has tended to impair
and discredit the dignity, standing, and influence of the supreme
court, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, and the
individual justices and judges, and to impede, embarrass, and prej-
udice the due administration of law and justice in and by said
courts.
Article VIII-About April, 1957, he accepted gifts from others
whose interests were likely to be submitted to him for judgment.
Article IX-As a candidate for the Supreme Court of Florida
during the primary elections of 1952, he accepted contributions from
corporations, contrary to the election laws of the State of Florida.
88. FiA. H.R. JouR. 1831-34 (Reg. Sess. 1957).
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The original vote on the adoption of these articles failed." How-
ever, a subsequent motion to reconsider the vote carried. 0 There-
after, a motion to temporarily defer consideration of the resolution
of impeachment was agreed to, and the matter was never reconsi-
dered. Judge Giblin never achieved his ambition of serving on the
Florida Supreme Court.
Judge Richard Kelly
In 1963 articles of impeachment containing the following charges
were voted against Circuit Judge Richard Kelly:
Article I-In a certain case in which privileged affidavits and
suggestions of his disqualification had been filed, he issued to the
attorneys a rule to show cause why they should not be held in con-
tempt for statements made in the affidavits. He then prepared an
opinion in advance of the show cause hearing finding these attorneys
to be in contempt.
He issued an order, containing no reference to any case before the
court, commanding one of the above attorneys to appear before him.
He violated the Judicial Code of Ethics by ordering the court clerk
to appear before him and then subjecting the clerk to threatening
and oppressive statements.
Article II-He used his office to disparage the reputation of attor-
neys, elected and appointed officials, and legislative representatives
before a partisan political group; and he participated in the prepa-
ration of a petition assailing nineteen attorneys of Pasco County as
undemocratic and un-American.
(Articles III and IV were stricken.)
Article V-He allowed, aided, or condoned the alteration of pub-
lic records in a particular case. In another case, he unlawfully and
unjustly held an attorney in contempt of court and fined him $200
and did, on the next day, rescind the order and request permission
to destroy the record of the contempt matter.
Article VI-Without notification to the prosecutor, he granted a
writ of habeas corpus.
Article VII-He unnecessarily interjected his personality into the
trial of cases before him by berating and harassing witnesses, attor-
neys, and court reporters; failed to properly prepare for trial by
informing himself of the law and proceedings governing cases; in-
dulged in partisan politics; discussed litigation pending before him
with the parties without presence of their attorneys of record; con-
89. Id. at 1834.
90. Id. at 1932.
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ducted and mismanaged his office to cause confusion by willfully
and deliberately alienating the attorneys of his circuit; violated the
Judicial Code of Ethics and committed other misdemeanors and
misconduct in office.
Article VIII-He intentionally, calculatedly, shrewdly, and ruth-
lessly embarked on a continuous course of conduct to intimidate
and embarrass members of the Pasco County Bar Association and
officials of Pasco County.'
Judge Kelly was acquitted of these charges .92 He remained on the
bench until 1974, when he was elected to Congress from the Fifth
Congressional District.
Lieutenant Governor Tom Adams
In 1973 the house attempted to vote the following articles of im-
peachment against Lieutenant Governor Tom Adams:
Article I-He brought his office into scandal and disrepute by
failing to perform his official duties and diverting public funds to
other than a proper public purpose in that he willfully assisted in
or procured payment of certain fraudulent travel expenses.
Article II-He unlawfully caused or permitted public funds to be
diverted to other than a proper public purpose by permitting re-
ceipts of taxes levied for public purposes to be disbursed for his own
private purpose in that one Roger Getford, when officially on duty
as an employee of the Department of Commerce, absented himself
on several occasions without official leave from duty with the de-
partment for the private purpose of Tom Adams with the knowl-
edge, consent, or at the direction of Tom Adams.
Artile III-He permitted receipts of taxes levied and appropriated
for public purposes of the Department of Commerce to be expended
for the private purpose of one Getford in that he willfully aided,
procured, or advised the preparation of certain travel vouchers
which were fraudulent or false as to a material matter.
Article IV-He caused or permitted public funds to be expended
and disbursed for the private purpose of one Getford by permitting
Getford, when officially on duty as an employee of the Department
of Commerce, to absent himself without official leave and by per-
mitting him to travel to and from Jacksonville on a date certain at
state expense for Getford's own private purpose.
Article V-He permitted public funds to be diverted for a private
purpose in that, with Adams' knowledge, consent, or at his direc-
91. FLA. H.R. JouR. 2634-37 (Reg. Sess. 1963).
92. FLA. S. JOUR. 403 (Court of Impeachment 1963).
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tion, Julia Johnson, when officially on duty as an employee of the
Department of Commerce, did absent herself without official leave
from duty from the department for Adams' private purpose.
Article VI-Contrary to law, he caused or permitted receipts of
taxes levied and appropriated for the public purpose of the Depart-
ment of Commerce to be expended for other than a proper public
purpose in that certain employees of the department were impro-
perly assigned on an overlap basis in certain positions with his
knowledge, consent, or at his direction.
Article VII-He diverted public funds for the private purpose of
one C.L. Hardin in that he assisted in, procured, or advised the
preparation of certain fraudulent travel vouchers.
Article VI-He knowingly and unlawfully caused or permitted
to be diverted public funds for Hardin's private purpose in that he
permitted Hardin, when officially on duty with the department, to
absent himself without official leave from duty, i.e., allowed Hardin
to travel on state time at public expense for the purpose of seeking
private employment.
Article IX-He unlawfully caused public funds to be diverted for
his own private purpose in that certain employees of the depart-
ment, when officially on duty, did absent themselves without offi-
cial leave from duty to accomplish the private purpose of Adams,
i.e., rendering services in the nature of perquisites without lawful
approval and accounting.
Article X-(was the same as Article II, though designating differ-
ent times and different private tasks)
Article XI-He unlawfully and knowingly caused or permitted
public funds to be diverted for a private purpose in that, with his
knowledge, consent, or at his direction, a certain employee of the
department was improperly and unlawfully assigned to and com-
pensated in a position for which he was not qualified and had never
performed any of the duties.
Article XII-He unlawfully permitted public funds to be dis-
bursed for the private purpose of Getford in that he approved an-
nual leave with pay for Getford as to a period of time when Getford
had no earned, accrued, and unused annual leave.
Article XIII-(was the same as Article IV with different dates and
places designated)
Article XIV-He knowingly and unlawfully caused or permitted
public funds to be diverted for private purposes, i.e., certain em-
ployees of the department were relieved from the performance of all




Articles XV-XVIII-(were the same as Article IV but specified
different private purposes and dates)
Article XIX-He unlawfully and willfully aided or assisted in,
procured, or advised preparation of certain fraudulent or false travel
vouchers for Getford, thereby diverting public funds for a private
purpose.
Articles XX-XXII-(were the same as Article IV but specified
different private purposes and dates)"
The house failed to adopt House Resolution 2022, the articles of
impeachment against Adams. 4 However, House Resolution 2037,
officially censuring Adams, was adopted. This resolution essentially
adopted the charges in the impeachment articles. 5 Although he was
stripped by Governor Reubin Askew of most of his authority, Adams
completed his term as Lieutenant Governor. He challenged Askew
for the Democratic nomination for Governor in 1974 but was de-
feated."
Commissioner of Education Floyd Christian
In April, 1974, a select committee of the house was appointed to
investigate Floyd T. Christian, commissioner of education. Chris-
tian, however, resigned his office shortly thereafter. 7
Insurance Commissioner Thomas D. O'Malley
Because of alleged official misconduct in office, Thomas D.
O'Malley, the State insurance commissioner and treasurer, was
impeached on the following grounds in 1975:
Article I-He instructed E.A. Faircloth, an employee of his de-
partment, to solicit a financial contribution from J.F. Bryan III,
chairman of the board and president of Independent Life and Acci-
dent Insurance Company. Faircloth then asked for the contribution,
and Bryan instructed an employee of his company to seek contribu-
tions from other company employees. The employee collected be-
tween $800 and $1,000 and personally delivered the funds to Fair-
93. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 617-27 (Reg. Sess. 1973).
94. Id. at 627.
95. Id. at 628-33.
96. See A. MORRIs, supra note 8, at 497. Askew removed Adams as Department of Com-
merce head after his censure. See Miami Herald, Dec. 21, 1973, § D, at 7, col. 2.
97. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 359, 458 (Reg. Sess. 1974).
Christian pleaded nolo contendere to State charges of receiving unlawful compensation and
of perjury, and pleaded guilty to federal charges of income tax evasion. He served approxi-
mately six months in federal prison. See Miami Herald, Sept. 17, 1975, § 2B, at 1, col. 1.
See also note 195 infra.
19781
28 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cloth in Miami. Faircloth in turn delivered the money to O'Malley.
At the time the contribution was sought, Bryan's company had a
request pending before the insurance commissioner to allow Inde-
pendent Life to exceed the ten percent limitation on investment in
real estate.
Article II-He falsely swore on his Statement of Elected Official
that it was a true, accurate, and total listing of all contributions to
him in excess of $25. The report did not reflect the $800 to $1,000
contribution he had received from Faircloth.
Article HI-In regard to the charges of Article I, he further, on or
about February 18, 1972, approved the special consent investment
for Independent Life, and he accepted the aforementioned contribu-
tion as a gift or favor that reasonably tended to improperly influence
him in the discharge of his official duties.
Article IV-He accepted unlawful compensation in that on De-
cember 31, 1970, he entered into a contract with Rich Ciravola and
Bennett Feldman whereby Ciravola and Feldman agreed to pur-
chase his seventy percent interest in the law firm then known as
O'Malley and Ciravola for $239,999 to be paid over the course of
eight years with interest at four percent per annum on the unpaid
balance. During this time, acting as receiver for certain insurance
companies, he retained the law firm of Ciravola and Feldman to
represent him in his capacity as insurance commissioner, which
resulted in payments of $34,222.63 to the law firm by the insurance
companies in liquidation, being compensation not authorized by
statute.
Article V-He unlawfully used his official position to secure spe-
cial privileges for himself and others (substantially the same factual
statement as Article IV).
Article VI-He had personal investments in an enterprise creat-
ing a substantial conflict between his private interests and the pub-
lic interest (substantially the same factual statement as Article IV).
Article VII-He received and accepted unlawful compensation for
the past, present, and future performance, nonperformance or viola-
tion of an act, rule or regulation that was incumbent upon him to
administer in that he received payments of $70,175 (1971-1974),
being compensation not authorized by law. He withheld approval
of Peninsular Life Insurance Company's plan for the proposed for-
mation of the McMillen Corporation until the company retained
Feldman as counsel for $10,000 plus expenses.
Article VIII-He used his official position to secure special privi-
leges or exemptions for himself or others in that he accepted a gift
of a one-eighth proprietary interest in a parcel of land-the Fort
Walton Square Shopping Center-and while part-owner of that
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shopping center, he approved a special consent investment (a sec-
ond lien, "wraparound" mortgage) which was pledged as security on
the shopping center.
Article IX-Under the facts set forth in Article VIII, while part-
owner and contracting party, he granted the special consent for the
"wraparound" mortgage, thereby granting financial savings of the
interest to himself and others, said act providing compensation not
authorized by law.
Article X-He falsely swore on his Statement of Elected Official
that the same was a true, accurate, and total listing of all contribu-
tions to him in excess of $25. The report did not reflect the gift of
the one-eighth proprietary interest in the parcel of land described
as Fort Walton Square Shopping Center.
Article XI-The conduct described in Articles I-X constitutes a
misdemeanor in office. 9
Upon O'Malley's resignation from office, the articles of impeach-
ment were dismissed.9 O'Malley suffered serious health problems
and has not sought public office since.
Supreme Court Justices
In 1975 a select committee of the house of representatives was
appointed to investigate several supreme court justices. The com-
mittee voted against the impeachment of supreme court Justice
Joseph Boyd,10 and Justices Hal Dekle and David McCain resigned
from the supreme court.'0 '
98. FLA. S. JouR. 734-37 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
99. FLA. S. JouR. 15-16 (Org. Sess.-Court of Impeachment 1975).
The chief justice granted the dismissal of the articles and adjourned the Court of Impeach-
ment on July 29, 1975, while the senate was not in session. He explained:
Therefore, under the circumstances, the convening of the Court of Impeachment
on September 16, 1975, would be a fruitless and useless procedure incurring addi-
tional and unnecessary expense to the State of Florida. Many Senators have con-
curred in the view that some method should be followed whereby these proceedings
could be dismissed without the further convening of the Senate as a 'Court of
Impeachment. The undersigned, as presiding officer under the provisions of Fla.
Const., art. III, § 17(c), F.S.A., finds, from the above that the trial of Commissioner
O'Malley by the Court of Impeachment could not take place without the appear-
ance and advocacy of the Board of Managers of the House of Representatives
charged with the prosecution. Therefore, the impeachment proceedings are ineffec-
tive and should be dismissed.
Id. at 16.
100. FLA. H.R. Joun. 400 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
101. The inquiries of Justices Boyd and Dekle concerned their alleged improper ex parte
receipt and use of a "secret" memorandum from an attorney involved in a case before the
court. See In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975); In re Dekle, 308 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1975).
The charges against Justice McCain stemmed from alleged improper personal involvement
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IV. IMPEACHMENT FOR ACTS PRIOR TO PRESENT TERM OF OFFICE
In the impeachment proceedings against Treasurer and Insurance
Commissioner Thomas O'Malley, conducted in 1975, the Florida
House of Representatives squarely faced the issue of whether offi-
cials may be impeached for acts committed prior to the present term
of office. House debate and the vote on the issue firmly established
that, in that body's view, officials may be impeached, removed from
office, and prevented from holding office in the future for miscon-
duct occurring prior to their current term. 12 However, Florida courts
have not been confronted with this question, and the senate has not
directly passed upon it.
In cases involving the suspension and removal of nonimpeachable
officials, the Florida Supreme Court has been consistent in its view
that such officers cannot be suspended by the Governor nor removed
by the senate for acts committed prior to their present term.0 3 A
recognized exception has been for misconduct of a continuing nature
that extended into the current term. 10 4
At the time the senate considered the first suspensions under the
1968 constitution, it considered itself bound by these judicial pre-
cedents and reinstated various officers on that basis. 05 Thereafter,
and as a result of dissatisfaction with those precedents, the legisla-
ture enacted section 112.42, Florida Statutes, allowing the Governor
to suspend an officer for misconduct occurring during his present
term or during the next preceding four years. 00 The power of the
in several cases. See Fla. H.R. Select Committee on Impeachment, I transcript of proceedings
(Feb. 25, 1975) (on file with House Judiciary Committee, State Legislative Library, and State
Archives).
1.02. See FLA. H.R. JoUR. 1196 (Reg. Sess. 1975) (remarks of Reps. Steinberg and Red-
man).
103. State ex rel. Hawthorne v. Wisehart, 28 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1946); Rosenfelder v. Huttoe,
24 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1945); State ex rel. Hardee v. Allen, 172 So. 222 (Fla. 1937); In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, 60 So. 337 (Fla. 1912); cf. State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d
609 (Fla. 1974) (holding circuit judge could not be removed from office by J. Q.C. for miscon-
duct occurring prior to tenure as circuit judge); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 12
So. 114 (Fla. 1893) (holding that suspension from office does not disqualify one from holding
same or other office in future).
In Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, 24 So. 2d at 110, Justice Terrell emphasized: "No rule is better
settled under our democratic theory than this; when one is re-elected or reappointed to an
office or position he is not subject to removal for offenses previously committed."
104. State ex rel. Hardee v. Allen, 172 So. 222 (Fla. 1937).
105. On February 17, 1969, the senate assembled in the first special session authorized
by FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 7(b), for the purpose of considering all orders of executive suspension
then pending. The Select Committee on Executive Suspensions, in a general report, advised
the senate that well-established law in Florida prohibited the suspension or removal of a
public officer for misconduct in a prior term of office. The senate applied the principle in
reinstating several suspended officers. FLA. S. JOUR. 7, 20, 21 (Spec. Sess. 1969).
106. Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 69-227, § 3, 1969 Fla. Laws 1020, as amended by Act of June
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legislature to relax the judicial interpretation of the constitution has
not yet been tested. "7 However, Justice B.K. Roberts, joined by
Justice James C. Adkins, dissenting in In Re Advisory Opinion to
the Governor Request of July 12, 1976, spoke to the constitutionality
of section 112.42.1" They noted the overwhelming weight of author-
ity for the proposition that once one is reelected or reappointed to
an office, he cannot be removed for offenses occurring in a prior
term. ,9
Earlier, the court held in State ex rel. Turner v. Earle that the
Judicial Qualifications Commission (J.Q.C.) could not recommend
the disciplining of a circuit judge for acts committed before he be-
came a circuit judge and while he held a different judgeship not
within the jurisdiction of the J.Q.C."0 Following that decision, the
27, 1971, ch. 71-333, § 1, 1971 Fla. Laws 1514 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 112.42 [19771).
107. The supreme court observed in State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla.
1974):
Although not applicable to the instant cause we note that in the 1969 session the
Legislature promulgated Chapter 69-277, Laws of Florida, (amended by Chapter
71-333, Laws of Florida), Section 112.42, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., relating to the
governor's power to suspend. This section provides: "112.42 Period during which
grounds may have occurred.-The governor may suspend any officer on any consti-
tutional ground for such suspension that occurred during the existing term of the
officer or during the next preceding four years." The constitutional question as to
whether the Legislature can enlarge the suspension power of the Governor as con-
veyed by Article IV, Section 7, Florida Constitution has not as yet been raised. The
constitutionality of this statute which obviously relates only to the Governor's
authority to suspend has not been measured against Article IV, Section 7, Florida
Constitution, F.S.A ....
Id. at 617 n.7. But see In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor Request of July 12, 1976, 336
So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1976), in which the court had an opportunity to determine the constitution-
ality of § 112.42 but decided that "such a determination should not be made in an advisory
opinion but should be resolved in regular trial and appellate proceedings where appropriate
factual issues can be developed."
108. 336 So. 2d 97.
109. Id. at 102.
110. 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1974). The court explained:
Recognizing that there are divergent views, we find that the rule supported by
the great weight of authority and specifically adopted by this Court in construing
statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing the removal of public officers
guilty of misconduct when such provisions do not refer to the term of office in which
the misconduct occurred is that a public officer may not be removed from office
for misconduct which he committed in another public office or in a prior term of
office in the absence of disqualifications to hold office in the future because of such
misconduct . ...
Id. at 613. But see In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970), which the Turner court affirmed
and distinguished as follows:
Furthermore, we must note that the question involved sub judice was not before
this Court in In Re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970). This opinion does not recede
from and is not to be confused with the decision in In Re Kelly, supra. In the Kelly
case, the investigation did extend backwards for a long period of time and into
another term of Judge Kelly but it must be remembered that at all times com-
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1974 legislature proposed an amendment to article V, section 12 of
the constitution which permitted the J.Q.C. to consider judicial
conduct "during term of office or otherwise occurring on or after
November 1, 1966."" The amendment was approved by the voters
in November, 1974.
With the legislature reacting so quickly to the decisions forbid-
ding disciplinary bodies from considering conduct occurring prior to
the current term of office, it was not surprising that the supreme
plained of Judge Kelly was a circuit judge and within the jurisdiction of the Qualifi-
cations Commission. Therein lies the difference in the two cases. Turner's alleged
misconduct occurred when he was not within the jurisdiction of the Qualifications
Commission as a matter of law and fact. Kelly's misconduct occurred when he was
within the jurisdiction of the Qualifications Commission as a matter of law and
fact. Therein lies the difference between the two cases and calls for a different rule
of law.
295 So. 2d at 618.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in a recent decision, considered whether Judge David L.
Taunton, County Judge, Gulf County, should be removed on recommendation by the Judicial
Qualifications Commission. Inquiry Concerning a Judge, J.Q.C. No. 77-16 (Fla. March 16,
1978). Judge Taunton argued that he could not be removed from office unless there was clear
and convincing evidence that he was guilty of serious and grievous wrong and that he commit-
ted it with a corrupt motive. The supreme court explained that the rule cited by Taunton
was the established and controlling rule when Judge Taunton failed to comply with the Code
of Judicial Conduct but that the people of Florida in November, 1976, adopted an amend-
ment to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(f), which added the following sentence: "Malafides, scienter
or moral turpitude on the part of a justice or judge shall not be required for removal from
office of a justice or judge whose conduct demonstrates a present unfitness to hold office,"
and that this amendment invalidated the prior rule as of the effective date of the amendment.
The court recognized that a judicial officer may now be removed from office if his conduct
demonstrates a present unfitness to hold office, even if he had good motive; however, as to
Judge Taunton the supreme court concluded:
We agree with respondent that the record is devoid of evidence of corruption or
corrupt motive on his part. We note that all of the activities for which he is to be
disciplined took place before the effective date of the amendment to Article V,
Section 12(f), Florida Constitution, and at a time when such activities, without
corrupt motive, would not warrant his removal from office. We are, therefore,
confronted with the question of whether the 1976 constitutional amendment may
be applied retroactively to transform his improper, but non-corrupt, conduct into
grounds for removal after the fact.
Due process, guaranteed by Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution, contem-
plates notice that an act is a removable offense at the time it is committed. Any
other conclusion would expose judicial officers to the unfair and untenable situation
in which even innocent acts of today could someday be declared improper and
subject them to punishment or removal from office. We cannot approve a rule that
would permit a review of every judge's past conduct each time a change in the law
occurs to determine whether innocent conduct of the past has been converted into
grounds for discipline under the new law. Judicial officers are justified in relying
on the current rule and in conducting themselves accordingly. We, therefore, hold
that the amendment to Article V, Section 12(f), has only prospective application.
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, slip op. at 12-13.
111. Fla. HJR 3911 (1974), 1974 Fla. Laws 1312.
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court held in 1975 that the J.Q.C. had the authority to recommend
the disciplining of a supreme court justice for misconduct which had
occurred prior to his present term."' Significantly, in rejecting his
contention that he could not be disciplined for acts done before that
term, the court cited one of its earlier decisions, In Re Kelly.' But
the court did not mention the 1974 constitutional amendment,
which specifically authorized consideration of conduct going back to
November, 1966."11 It was apparently this consistent legislative, ju-
dicial, and voter activity which led the chairman of the impeach-
ment committee in the O'Malley case to conclude that an interven-
ing election was not a bar to impeachment."'
Although the nonjudicial indicators point to the conclusion that
neither reelection nor reappointment prevents impeachment, the
question is still very much debatable. In the absence of a judicial
or senatorial interpretation or an amendment to the constitution,
the issue can be expected to arise whenever the conduct being con-
sidered as grounds for impeachment has occurred prior to the offi-
cer's next term.
The United States House of Representatives faced this issue in
1873, and the report of the Committee on the Judiciary at that time
has often been cited as precedent for the view that an officer may
not be impeached for conduct occurring before his current term."6
112. In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975).
113. 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970). See note 110 supra.
114. 308 So. 2d at 22.
115. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1196 (Reg. Sess. 1975). In that debate Rep. Redman, the committee
chairman, also observed that because impeachment could lead to disqualification from hold-
ing office in the future, it was distinguishable from other types of discipline and therefore
not governed by the precedent in those cases.
116. The report appears in full in IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERALS, supra note 71. It
states, in part:
It will be seen from a few illustrations that it hardly could have been the intend-
ment of the Constitution that an officer could be impeached for a crime committed
by him before his entry into the office from which he is to be removed because, if
this were so, there is no constitutional, and, thus far, no legal limitation as to the
time during which he may be held so amenable to such impeachment.
One may have committed a high misdemeanor in his early youth, repented it,
outlived it, or may have been pardoned, and, in the language of the law, by that
pardon "made as white as snow," and yet, without limitation, years afterwards may
be impeached for that crime and deprived of an office by him afterward held, which
he has filled to the entire satisfaction of all good men. Indeed, impeachment may
in this way be used as a means of removing from the possibility of election a popular
candidate whom the people desire to elect to the highest office within their gift, if
an opposed House of Representatives chose to impeach for a high misdemeanor of
many years' standing and present that to the Senate, who, upon finding the fact,
are bound to give judgment, or, if not bound, might be willing to give judgment of
disqualification from office forever, from the effect of which judgment no power
under the Constitution could relieve; for cases of impeachment are expressly ex-
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Vice President Schuyler Colfax had interested himself in a corpora-
tion known as Credit Mobilier of America. Credit Mobilier stock
was allegedly sold to Colfax at a price below market value in an
attempt to influence his performance as a member and as Speaker
of the House. All the transactions were completed while he was a
Congressman, but the inquiry came after he became Vice Presi-
dent."
Colfax's case was referred to the Judiciary Committee by House
resolution, and the report was the committee's response." '8 The com-
mittee concluded that because the questionable acts happened be-
fore Colfax assumed his present office, they did not warrant im-
peachment. The committee's position was clear and unambiguous.
But it did not put the issue to rest in the Congress. The same issue
was again raised and debated in committee when the impeachment
of President Richard Nixon was considered a century later."'
The question of whether impeachment is a remedial or a punitive
process lies at the base of the prior conduct controversy. If it is
viewed as punitive, that is, as criminal in nature, an officer should
be answerable whenever his misconduct is discovered. His past ac-
tions have tainted him, and the assumption of a new office or the
beginning of a new term should be irrelevant. However, if impeach-
ment is remedial, that is, designed to terminate an officer's tenure
because he has conducted himself improperly while in that office,
the inquiry and impeachment action should be concerned only with
those acts committed during the current term.
The remedial theory appears to have been contemplated by the
drafters of the Florida constitution. First, the stated ground is
"misdemeanor in office," the terms of which seem to exclude from
consideration any misdemeanor committed before assumption of
office.2 0 The same constitutional provision renders an official an-
swerable for his criminal acts even though tried by the senate upon
cepted, and no law could avail, nor even the unanimous election of the whole people
could give absolution.
Id. at 601-15.
117. The case is discussed in detail in the 1873 Judiciary Committee report.
118. The resolution passed on February 20, 1873, and provided:
Resolved, that the testimony taken by the committee of this House of which Mr.
Poland, of Vermont, is chairman, be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary,
with instructions to inquire whether anything in such testimony warrants articles
of impeachment of any officer of the United States not a member of this House, or
makes it proper that further investigation should be ordered in his case ....
IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS, supra note 71, at 601.
119. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, H.R. REP. No.
1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-60, 146-56, 303-06 (1974).
120. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17.
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impeachment. Thus, if impeachment were intended to be punitive,
the officer would be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense,
a violation of both the state and federal constitutions. 2' Second,
article VI, section 4 of the state constitution provides grounds for
the disqualification of persons from holding office. 22 If certain prior
conduct does not disqualify the person under article VI, section 4
from holding the office, the constitutional draftsmen could hardly
have intended that it be grounds for removal once the office is
attained. Third, although an officer convicted upon impeachment
may be prevented (in the discretion of the senate) from holding
public office in the future, 2 3 an officer not subject to impeachment
who is suspended by the Governor and removed from office by the
senate may be elected or appointed to the same or another office in
the future. 24 Thus, an official suspended and then removed from
office who later assumed an office which is subject to impeachment
would take the office with constitutional permission and should not
be liable to impeachment for the same offense for which he had
previously been suspended. Finally, the fact that an impeachment
is tried by the senate and not by a jury is further evidence that the
drafters intended it to be something other than a criminal proceed-
ing. 125
The wisdom of this apparent constitutional intent is certainly
debatable. The arguments in favor of that position are supported by
reason and logic. If the house of representatives may search an
official's past for conduct that qualifies as an impeachable offense
and, no matter when it occurred or how well it was known by his
constituency, such conduct may be the basis for his impeachment,
our highest offices could be filled only by those having the continu-
ous approval of two-thirds of the legislature. It would not matter
that the people had elected the person or the Governor had ap-
pointed him with full knowledge of those past acts. Nor would it
matter that, at the time of his taking office, the person possessed
all the constitutional qualifications for the office. If there were any
offenses in his background that, in the conscience and discretion of
two-thirds of the representatives and senators, could qualify as
grounds for impeachment, he could be removed from office and
121. U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
122. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 provides: "No person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated
in this or other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or hold office until
restoration of civil rights or removal of disability."
123. Id. art. III, § 17(c).
124. See State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1974).
125. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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prevented from holding office in the future. 2 '
It is also apparent that changing times may convert a past act,
considered innocent when committed, into an impeachable offense.
Or, as discussed in the 1873 Judiciary Committee report concerning
the Credit Mobilier incident, legislative bodies may base impeach-
ment upon activities that were considered improper in times past
but are no longer considered so.'2 Changing laws and changing so-
cial mores may capture an impeachable officer in a vise of events.
The well-settled judicial rule in Florida that when one is reelected
or reappointed to an office or position, he is not subject to removal
for offenses previously committed, is premised on the belief that the
voters or appointing authority may select the candidate of their
choice and that the legislature may not second-guess that choice or
substitute legislative wisdom for citizen wisdom. 28 It is argued that
reelection or reappointment has a cleansing effect and that the offi-
cer who is so cleansed cannot be removed from his new office with-
out violating the will of the people or the constitutional prerogative
126. The committee discussed the problem in the 1873 report:
But the answer seems to us an obvious one that the Constitution has given to
the House of Representatives no constitutional power over such considerations of
"justice and sound policy" as a qualification in representation. On the contrary,
the Constitution has given this power to another and higher tribunal, to wit, the
constituency of the member. Every intendment of our form of government would
seem to point to that. This is a Government of the people, which assumes that they
are the best judges of the social, intellectual, and moral qualifications of their
Representatives whom they are to choose, not anybody else to choose for them; and
we, therefore, find in the people's Constitution and frame of government they have,
in the very first article and second section, determined that "the House of Repre-
sentatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people
of the States," not by Representatives chosen for them at the will and caprice of
members of Congress from other States according to the notions of the "necessities
of self-preservation and self-purification" which might suggest themselves of the
reason or caprice of the members from other States in any process of purgation of
purification which two-thirds of the members of either House may "deem neces-
sary" to prevent bringing "the body into contempt and disgrace."
IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS, supra note 71, at 609.
127. Not many years ago, the House of Representatives witnessed a motion for
expulsion of the "old man eloquent," once a President [sic] of the United States,
as "tainted with crime," because he presented a petition for the abolition of slavery.
Nay, more a movement for expulsion, changed to a vote of censure, passed by 125
to 60, against Joshua R. Giddings, of Ohio, as a tainted man, unfit for association
with his fellow-members, because he presented a series of resolutions declaring that
some African negroes, who, having endured the horrors of the middle passage in a
slave-ship, had the natural and inherent right to rise upon their captors and oppres-
sors at sea, and regain their liberty taken from them by fraud and force.
Id. at 612.
128. Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, 24 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1945), cited with approval in State ex rel.
Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, 615 (Fla. 1974).
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of the appointing authority."9
The opposing argument has logical merit and considerable popu-
lar appeal. Why, it is asked, should a person be permitted to commit
an impeachable offense, conceal the facts, secure reappointment or
reelection, possibly without opposition, and then take his new term
without fear of removal? The answer is not easy. An impeachable
act committed at the end of a prior term, perhaps after the election
process is complete, would be excluded from consideration in the
present term. A previously committed impeachable offense which
impairs the ability of the official in the performance of his present
duties should not be ignored, it is argued. And the Florida Legisla-
ture apparently agrees with these arguments. The decision in State
ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 10 as seen earlier, resulted in legislative pro-
129. In 1974, Justice Joseph Boyd of the Florida Supreme Court was an opposed candidate
for reelection to a new six-year term on the court. He made public certain charges that had
been leveled against him with the J.Q.C. as well as rumors of wrongdoing on his part. In the
contested nonpartisan election, Justice Boyd was overwhelmingly reelected, winning 66 of 67
counties. This reelection notwithstanding, Justice Boyd was investigated by the House Select
Committee on Impeachment in 1975. The investigation was based on the very facts that had
been placed before the voters the previous year. No impeachment action was recommended
by the committee. Therefore, neither house was forced to confront the issue.
130. 295 So. 2d 609. Circuit Judge Jack Turner sought to prohibit the J.Q.C. from pro-
ceeding against him for acts committed while he was a judge of the Criminal Court of Record
and prior to the time he was elected as circuit judge. The Florida Supreme Court accepted
jurisdiction under its rulemaking authority. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(c) (1968, amended 1973).
The primary question the court addressed was whether the J.Q.C. had jurisdiction to investi-
gate and, if appropriate, to recommend discipline of an incumbent circuit judge for alleged
misconduct committed prior to the time he became circuit judge and while he held another
office not within the jurisdiction of the J.Q.C.
Turner was elected to a six-year term on the circuit court beginning in January, 1973. He
was commissioned on November 8, 1973. Before becoming a circuit judge, Turner had been
elected and commissioned for a term of four years as judge of the Criminal Court of Record,
commencing in January, 1969. He served in that position until January, 1973. A grand jury
returned an indictment against Turner on April 6, 1973, charging that he had conspired to
commit bribery from August 14, 1972, through October 13, 1972. The J.Q.C. then initiated
proceedings against Turner, charging him with conduct unbecoming an officer, based on the
aforedescribed conduct. Turner was later tried before a jury and acquitted. Upon learning
that the J.Q.C. intended to file a second request for his suspension, Turner sought relief from
the Florida Supreme Court. The court summarized its holdings as follows:
(1) Prohibition is not an appropriate remedy to challenge proceedings by the
Judicial Qualifications Commission, but this Court has jurisdiction in this cause
under its rule making power and the all writs provisions of the Constitution.
(2) Consistent with the overwhelming weight of authority in the nation as herein-
above set forth, we hold that a public official cannot be disciplined or removed from
the office of Circuit Judge upon which he entered January 2, 1973, for misconduct
alleged to have occurred in 1972 while such public officer held the office of Judge
of the Criminal Court of Record, and [sic] office not within the jurisdiction of the
Judicial Qualifications Commission at anytime during the year of 1972. This hold-
ing is not intended in any manner or wise to recede from the Kelly case, supra,
which was anchored to an entirely different set of facts as hereinabove mentioned
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posal of a constitutional amendment effectively nullifying the deci-
sion.'3' Similarly, a corrective statute was passed in response to the
executive suspension cases reviewed by the legislature in 1969.3
A reasonable alternative to the two extreme positions described
above would be to permit consideration of conduct of specified
types, whether occurring in the present term or in some reasonable
period prior to the present term. Such a provision is needed not only
in impeachment cases but also in cases of suspension and removal
of officers not subject to impeachment, and in cases of expulsion
from the legislature as well. All these procedures, as well as those
of the J.Q.C., should be governed by a standard constitutional pro-
vision that, like article V, section 12(a) of the Florida constitution,
would fix a specific date after which all conduct could be consid-
ered, or that, like section 112.42 of the Florida Statutes, would
specify a time period prior to the present term for which conduct
could be considered.
As long as the question remains as to whether an officer may be
impeached for conduct occurring prior to the present term, the pos-
sibility of a harmful confrontation between the legislature and the
judiciary remains as well. 133 Such a confrontation could be avoided
and set forth. Significantly but not controlling, Judge Turner was acquitted by a
jury of the charges complained of by the Judicial Qualifications Commission.
(3) The Judicial Qualifications Commission may investigate the alleged miscon-
duct of the Relator, Judge Jack M. Turner, within a reasonable time backwards
but not exceeding two years behind the date upon which he assumed new duties
having been elected Circuit Judge in the 1972 elections, but any misconduct estab-
lished during 1972 cannot, standing'alone, serve as a basis for his discipline as a
Circuit Judge but can be used only insofar as such investigation develops evidence
germane to charges allegedly occurring in the current term of office.
295 So. 2d at 619.
131. Fla. HJR 3911 (1974), 1974 Fla. Laws 1312.
132. Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 69-277, § 3, 1969 Fla. Laws 1020, as amended by Act of June
27, 1971, ch. 71-333, § 1, 1971 Fla. Laws 1514 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 112.42 [1977]). In
addition to the case involving the Taylor County Commissioners, FLA. S. JOUR. 18-29 (Spec.
Sess. 1969), the senate in 1969 considered the case of State attorney William R. Slaughter
who, while under investigation by the Governor in the spring of 1968, received an uncontested
party nomination to a new term of office and was unopposed by anyone from the other party.
With reelection assured, he then resigned from office. When he attempted to take his new
term the following January, Governor Claude Kirk withheld his commission and entered a
suspension order. Again the senate felt itself bound by judicial precedent and ordered rein-
statement. FLA. S. JOUR. 12-14 (Spec. Sess. 1969).
133. During the impeachment proceedings against Thomas O'Malley, Rep. Paul Stein-
berg voiced concern as to whether the house had the right to hear matters that took place
prior to O'Malley's election to his present term, especially since those matters were brought
out before his reelection by indictments of the grand jury, by the campaign participants, and
by the newspapers. FLA. H.R. JouR. 1196 (Reg. Sess. 1975). To this inquiry Rep. James
Redman responded:
Well, let me tell you how: Our Committee-we've had Staff research this and its
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by the incorporation into the constitution of an appropriate provi-
sion similar to the ones discussed above.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
In an early advisory opinion to the Governor, the Supreme Court
of Florida announced that the senate, when trying an impeachment
case, is unquestionably a court with original and final jurisdiction
to determine questions of both law and fact.'34 "Its judgments," the
court said, "can become the subject of reversal or review in no other
court known to the Constitution and the laws."' 13 5
Article II, section 3 of the Florida constitution provides that
"[tihe powers of the state government shall be divided into legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other
branches unless expressly provided herein. 1' 30 Insofar as article III,
section 17 can be said to make impeachment a power "appertaining
to" the legislature, article II, section 3 seems to prohibit any intru-
sion into the impeachment process by the judiciary. Furthermore,
application of the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
to article III, section 17 leads to the conclusion that impeachment
is exclusively a legislative function. 37 Other evidence to buttress
[sic] their opinion, and the opinion of others, I might add, that are experts in the
field, that due to our Constitution that says that a member, the Governor, a mem-
ber of the Cabinet, or member of the Supreme Court, the District Court of Appeal,
the Circuit Judges, being that they could be qualified, disqualified from holding
office in the future, that we could go back.
Now, we arrived at that determination and Representative Rish's Committee,
who came along after our initial appointment but before we really got cranked up
so much this time, their Committee arrived at the same determination. It made us
feel like we were on sounder ground when another Committee of the House arrived
at the same conclusion we did independent of each other and without too much
doubt.
Id. See also id. (remarks of Rep. Eric Crabtree). Note, however, that until the senate concurs
in this matter with the house, this decision of the house cannot serve as precedent for the
legislature.
134. In re Executive Commun. Filed the 17th Day of April, A.D. 1872, 14 Fla. 289 (1872).
Governor Reed was under suspension by reason of articles of impeachment having been voted
against him by the assembly. The court held that the senate's adjournment without disposi-
tion of the impeachment articles did not terminate his suspension. Therefore, he was not
entitled to seek the opinion of the court.
135. Id. at 295.
136. [Emphasis added.]
137. In Weinberger v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 112 So. 253 (Fla. 1927), the court ex-
pressly declared:
The principle is well established that, where the Constitution expressly provides
the manner of doing a thing, it impliedly forbids its being done in a substantially
different manner. Even though the Constitution does not in terms prohibit the
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this conclusion can be found in the executive article, which denies
the Governor the power to grant clemency in cases where impeach-
ment results in conviction. 3 '
Because no one has ever been convicted after impeachment, the
Florida Supreme Court has never had an opportunity to overturn
such a conviction. However, when Justice David McCain was under
investigation by a house select committee on impeachment in 1975,
he asked the supreme court to exercise its "all writs" power to
review procedures or set guidelines for the committee that would
guarantee his due process rights. The court summarily declined the
invitation.'39 As noted above, the court has rendered advisory opin-
ions on and made observations in dicta about impeachment, but
direct judicial precedent on the question of the court's power to
review any part of impeachment proceedings is nonexistent. 140
doing of a thing in another manner, the fact that it has prescribed the manner in
which the thing shall be done is itself a prohibition against a different manner of
doing it.
Id. at 256.
138. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a).
139. McCain v. Select Comm. on Impeachment, Fla. House of Representatives, 313 So.
2d 722 (Fla. 1975).
140. For an opinion construing the role of the judiciary in matters relating to impeach-
ment restrictively, see In re Executive Commun. Filed the 17th Day of April, A.D. 1872, 14
Fla. 289 (1872), in which the court stated:
It is proper to inquire here whether we have any legal right or power to determine
what the effect of this action is under the circumstances. If we have not; if it shall
be, as we conceive it is, the exclusive and sole province of the Senate to determine
that question; if by so doing we usurp a jurisdiction not vested in this court by the
State Constitution and wrest a case now pending from a court of exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the trial of the subject, and presume to review its action and discharge
what we may conceive to be its duty, it is plain that such action is improper.
. . . The Senate, when thus organized, is unquestionably a court-because it is
a body invested with judicial functions; because it determines issues both of law
and fact; because it announces the law in the form of judgment, and through that
instrumentality adjudges the penalties named by the Constitution. Not only is it a
court, but it is a court of exclusive original and final jurisdiction. Its judgments can
become the subject of reversal or review in no other court known to the Constitution
and the laws. This simple exercise of judicial functions, the application of law to
facts and announcing its conclusions, are not extraordinary or transcendent powers.
Nor is the simple fact that its jurisdiction is both original and final a circumstance
which alone would justify us in ascribing to it any extraordinary degree of import-
ance, because the general reason why a court has both original and final jurisdiction
is the small degree of importance of the matter involved. Not only is this tribunal
a court, but it is a court of great importance. Its jurisdiction is not indeed very
extensive as to the number of the subjects-matter which may come under its con-
trol, but the sphere in which it acts, while limited to but one class of cases, is most
high and transcendent. This is so because of the subject-matter of its jurisdiction,
the degree and extent of the punishment it imposes, and the exclusive power which
it has of regulating its practice arising upon any matter pending before it. All other
persons in whom judicial power is vested under the Constitution derive their exist-
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A fair consideration of the cases involving executive suspension
and removal, a process also thought by many to be beyond judicial
review, leads to the conclusion that the court is not at all reluctant
to participate in procedures assigned to other branches.' 4
Similarly, the court recently chose to exercise at least a minimal
review of the exercise of the clemency power by the executive
branch. The court accepted jurisdiction when asked to examine
rules established by the Governor and Cabinet for reviewing cases
in which the death penalty has been imposed. However, the court
limited its consideration to whether the clemency power was being
exercised according to the constitutional grant of authority and
whether constitutionally impermissible conditions were being im-
posed. Finding no fault in the procedures in these respects, the court
held that clemency is a matter of grace exclusively within the execu-
tive branch and declined to review the rules.' Although exercising
ence from a delegated power to the Governor or Governor and Senate. These persons
represent the people directly through the exercise of the elective franchise ...
Under these circumstances, we submit that we should and must be very careful how
we act in such matters. This jurisdiction is too high and transcendent to be invaded.
Our power in the matter of this impeachment is limited and circumscribed by
the fact that it is a matter beyond our jurisdiction entirely. After an impeachment
perfected according to the Constitution, the whole matter is with the Senate, and
it has the exclusive right of determining all questions which may arise in the case.
Id. at 294-96, 300. However, the court further explained: "If its action is unconstitutional,
we have the right and power to declare its nullity and, in a proper case before us, to enforce
the right of any party of which it proposed to deprive him." Id. at 300.
141. See Barr & Karl, Executive Suspension and Removal of Public Officers Under the
1968 Florida Constitution, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 635, 646 (1971).
An interesting case decided after publication of the cited article is State ex rel. Meyerson
v. Askew, 269 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1972). The senate voted to remove Meyerson, a constable in
Dade County who had been suspended by the Governor. The court reinstated him. The court
ignored the opinion in State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 155 So. 129, 134 (Fla. 1934), which
held: "The matter of reviewing the charges and the evidence to support them is solely in the
discretion of the Senate; and, in doing this, it may adopt such rules of procedure as it sees
fit. Its judgment in this is final, and will not be reviewed by the courts." The procedure used
by the court in Meyerson was as remarkable as its failure to follow precedent. Meyerson,
following his removal by the senate, petitioned the court for writs of quo warranto and
mandamus and other extraordinary relief. The attorney general moved for a dismissal of the
petition. Without considering either the testimony taken by the committee or the debate on
the senate floor preceding the vote on removal, the court denied the motion and granted the
relief requested in quo warranto. The court evidently misconceived the purpose of the com-
mittee report and did not understand that the senate had voted to uphold the Governor's
suspension order only after examination of the full committee transcript and presentation by
the committee of oral and written reports. Meyerson should dispel any doubt about the
court's willingness to intrude into suspension-removal matters.
142. Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312 (Fla.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 232 (1977); cf. Dade
County Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1972) (holding that
judiciary cannot compel legislature to exercise a purely legislative prerogative-establishing
guidelines for public employee collective bargaining-but that continued inaction would lead
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considerable judicial restraint, the court nevertheless refused sim-
ply to deny jurisdiction and remain completely uninvolved. Instead,
it reserved for the judiciary the final word on whether the executive
is following the constitutional mandates and remaining within con-
stitutional limitations.
Certainly the court would be equally prepared to prevent any
departure from the literal grant of the impeachment power.' The
court could rightfully relieve a convicted official of a greater penalty
than that which is specifically authorized by the constitution. How-
ever, two-thirds of the members of either house of the legislature
would probably not attempt such a deviation from the specific con-
stitutional provisions.
Other questions more likely to be presented to the court in the
future include the legal sufficiency of the grounds charged, the reli-
ance on acts committed prior to the officer's current term, and the
application of due process principles.'44 Perhaps these questions will
be settled relative to the respective powers and duties of the execu-
tive and judicial branches, as in the Nixon tapes controversy.' In
the court to fashion such guidelines by judicial decree).
143. For example, the court could prevent the senate from trying an official who had not
been impeached by the house or who had been impeached but not by the required two-thirds
vote. Similarly, an attempt to impeach or try an officer other than those mentioned in the
impeachment section of the constitution could be halted by the court.
144. Also, the question of whether article I, §§ 9 and 16 of the Florida constitution apply
to impeachment proceedings in exactly the same way as they apply to criminal proceedings
will surely arise in the future. In his brief for the senate in the Holt impeachment trial, Chief
Justice Terrell told the members:
The respondent [official) is entitled (1) to be informed of the nature of the charges
against him; (2) he is entitled to the aid of counsel; (3) to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; (4) to compulsory process of witnesses; (5) he cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself; (6) the rules of evidence observed in
court trials are generally applicable; (7) a reasonable doubt of guilt must result in
acquittal; (8) there must be showing of wrong intent, while one may be presumed
to intend the necessary results of his voluntary acts, it is only a presumption and
may not at all times be inferable from the act; (9) precedents have due weight and
every other constitutional guaranty is accorded respondent.
FLA. S. Joua. 522 (Court of Impeachment 1957).
145. President Nixon was named as an unindicted co-conspirator by a grand jury of the
United States District court for the District of Columbia. The grand jury indicted seven
named persons for offenses including conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy
to obstruct justice. Upon motion of the special prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued
to Nixon which required that he produce certain tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts, and
other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between Nixon and others.
Nixon sought to quash the subpoena, claiming privilege. The district court denied the motion
to quash, determined that the judiciary is the final arbiter of a claim of executive privilege,
and concluded that the special prosecutor had made a prima facie demonstration of need
sufficiently compelling to warrant judicial examination in chambers. The special prosecutor
filed a petition for writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court of the United States, and Nixon
cross-petitioned. Both petitions were granted.
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any event, there can be little doubt that, just as in cases of suspen-
sion or removal, an officer whose impeachment violates the mini-
mum requirements of due process or any other of his constitutional
rights will be afforded relief in either state or federal court.'"
VI. IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
An officer is not impeached until the house of representatives, by
two-thirds vote, adopts articles of impeachment.' 7 But every step
in the procedure leading up to the vote is critical.
The constitution is silent about the specific procedures which
must be used in impeachment matters. Each house, however, is
Questions considered by the Supreme Court included whether the separation of powers
doctrine precludes judicial review of a President's claim of privilege and whether the Court
should hold as a matter of constitutional law that the privilege prevailed over the subpoena
duces tecum. The privilege asserted by Nixon was not based on any claim that either military
or diplomatic secrets were involved. Holding that the legitimate needs of the judicial system
outweighed the assertion of presidential privilege in this case, the Supreme Court explained
that:
[T]he allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably rele-
vant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law
and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A President's acknowledged
need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature,
whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal
proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal
case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal
prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confiden-
tiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of
conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal
cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed mate-
rials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of
law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712-13 (1974).
For a discussion of the interaction of governmental branches and problems created by the
simultaneous investigative activities of the special prosecutor and the House Impeachment
Committee, see L. JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER (1976).
146. The court may also be asked to dismiss impeachment charges if the senate fails to
convene as a court within six months of the impeachment as required by FLA. CONST. art.
III, § 17(c).
For an example of federal court involvement in suspension-removal matters, see Fair v.
Kirk, 317 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Fla. 1970), in which the court approved the Florida suspension-
removal procedures. The federal court did not hesitate to take jurisdiction and left no doubt
as to its authority to decide whether a public official's constitutional rights had been violated.
In addition, see McCarley v. Sanders, 309 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ala. 1970), in which a three-judge
district court invalidated the expulsion of a senator from the Senate of Alabama because he
had not been afforded procedural due process.
147. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(a).
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granted general power to determine rules of procedure.'4 8 Atten-
dance of witnesses and production of documents may be compelled
by the house when in session. And such powers may be delegated
by law to a committee when the legislature is not in session.'49 The
house of representatives has adopted rules in each session, and all
impeachment proceedings have been conducted according to the
rules in force at the time of the impeachment proceedings. All ses-
sions of the house and of its committees are open to the public.'50
The impeachment process may begin in a variety of ways. A
member may simply offer articles of impeachment and move the
house to adopt them. A member may request an investigation of an
impeachable official. A committee of substance may suggest an
investigation. Or the speaker of the house may appoint a member
or a committee to investigate allegations of misconduct that have
been either formally or informally brought to his attention.'5 ' In
recent times, the speaker has appointed committees and referred
specific investigations to them. '52
Because the house has sole and exclusive authority to impeach,'53
and because articles of impeachment serve as a charging document,
the house's role is similar to that of a grand jury.5 4 Thus, the house
determines whether probable cause exists to believe the accused
official has committed an impeachable offense.' 5 It follows that the
role of the committee is to conduct the investigation and recom-
mend to the house the existence or absence of probable cause.
In its investigation the committee may use its subpoena powers
and may recommend punishment for failure of a witness to respond
or for other contemptuous action.'58 The officer being investigated
148. Id. § 4(a).
149. Id. § 5.
150. Id. § 4(b).
151. Id. § 17(a); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1724 (1957).
152. Rep. James Redman served as chairman of the committees which investigated
charges against Lieutenant Governor Tom Adams, Education Commissioner Floyd T. Chris-
tian, Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Thomas O'Malley, and Comptroller Fred 0.
Dickinson. Rep. Billy Joe Rish was appointed chairman of the Select Committee on Impeach-
ment to investigate charges against Justices Joseph Boyd, Hal Dekle, and David McCain.
153. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(a).
154. In re Executive Commun. of the 9th of Nov., A.D. 1868, 12 Fla. 653 (1868) (opinion
of Chief Justice Randall); Fla. H.R., Select Committee on Impeachment, I transcript of
proceedings at 3 (Feb. 25, 1975) (on file with House Judiciary Committee, State Legislative
Library, and State Archives); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1194 (Reg. Sess. 1975) (remarks of Rep. Red-
man).
155. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1194 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
156. See sources cited note 154 supra.
On April 8, 1975, Rep. Billy Joe Rish, as chairman of a select committee on impeachment
that was investigating certain supreme court justices, requested amendments to the house
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may be compelled to respond to a subpoena, but he should not be.'57
The better practice is to invite the person being investigated to
present any testimony or other evidence he wishes the committee
to consider. The official may invoke his constitutional right to re-
main silent and may similarly protect his private documents.' '8 But
his official records are public documents available to the commit-
tee. 1
59
Requiring an official to testify before the house investigating com-
mittee may render him immune from impeachment and could con-
ceivably grant him immunity from criminal prosecution.'60 Un-
doubtedly a respondent official in an impeachment proceeding
would assert immunity from impeachment if required to testify be-
fore a grand jury as to impeachable acts.'6 '
rules which authorized the use of depositions, interrogatories, and subpoenas for the produc-
tion of documents. The amendments established a procedure for the resolution of conflicts
arising during the taking of depositions, with a right of appeal to the speaker of the house in
the event of dissatisfaction with the committee chairman's decision. FLA. H.R. JouR. 10-11
(Reg. Sess. 1975). Rep. Richard Hodes, a medical doctor as well as a legislator, offered the
following additional amendment to the rules:
Physical and Mental Examination
(a) Order for Examination. When the mental or physical condition of a person
subject to an impeachment inquiry is raised by a member as a possible basis for
disability in office, the Chairman, with the concurrence of the Speaker, may order
the peison subject to the inquiry to submit to a physical and/or mental examination
by a physician or physicians. The order may be made only on motion by a member
of the committee and for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be
examined. If the person to be examined objects to the order, the Chairman of the
committee conducting the impeachment inquiry shall take the matter before the
full House which must approve the order by a two-thirds vote before it may become
effective.
(b) Report. If requested by the person examined, the committee causing the
examination to be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of
the examining physician or physicians setting out the findings, including results of
all tests made, diagnoses and conclusions, with similar reports of all earlier exami-
nations of the same condition.
Id. at 11. The Hodes amendment was withdrawn, but the other proposals were adopted. Id.
at 11, 108, 265. As to the matter contained in Rep. Hodes's original recommendation which
he withdrew, see the report of Rep. Rish's select committee, which recommended that the
J.Q.C. require a mental and physical examination of a justice. Id. at 400.
157. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 5. An officer has an incentive to respond to a subpoena insofar
as his failure to do so may be construed as contemptuous conduct which in itself may
constitute grounds for impeachment.
158. Id. art. I, § 9.
159. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-.12 (1977).
160. See State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973)
(holding that statutory requirement of a response under threat of license revocation or suspen-
sion by licensed real estate broker charged with violations of Real Estate License Law com-
pelled the broker to be a witness against himself as forbidden by state and federal constitu-
tions).
161. See FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1977). Claims to immunity by impeachable officers would
place the power of the judiciary to review impeachment proceedings squarely in issue.
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A committee report finding no probable cause for impeachment
may be accepted by the house and the case may be closed, but the
house has the power to reject the report and require further investi-
gation or other appropriate action.'
Upon presentation to the house, articles of impeachment are de-
bated under the rules of the house just as any other proposal would
be. The chairman of the investigating committee, any member of
the committee, or any other house member may speak in favor of
or in opposition to the proposal to impeach. Evidence received by
the committee may be summarized or exhibited during debate. In
the absence of unanimous consent, only members are permitted to
participate in the proceedings.16 3
The full house can act on impeachment only when both houses
of the legislature are in session.' This requirement may result in a
substantial delay between the completion of the investigation and
the next legislative session. Having such sensitive matters unre-
solved for any appreciable period can easily disrupt a legislative
session. 165
Members of the house of representatives, although performing
investigatory and accusatory functions, remain representatives of
their respective constituencies and are, therefore, approachable by
those whom they represent. When an official is under investigation
by a committee, or when debate on the question of impeachment is
anticipated, it is common for interested citizens, lobbyists, attor-
neys, news media representatives, and others to contact the mem-
bers to discuss the evidence as well as the guilt or innocence of the
respondent official. Because all meetings are open, the proceedings
are reported by all news media. At least in this respect, house im-
peachment proceedings are the antithesis of the secret grand jury
procedure.
After disposition of amendments and motions, a vote of the mem-
162. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(a).
163. At each organizational session, the house adopts rules which involve these subjects.
See journals of house organizational sessions held in November of even-numbered years.
Customarily, only the changes in rules of the preceding session are published in the journal.
A complete compilation of house rules is published periodically for use by the members and
other interested persons. Copies of previously published rules are on file in the office of the
clerk of the house of representatives.
164. In re Executive Commun. of the 9th of Nov., A.D. 1868, 12 Fla. 653 (1868); FLA.
CONST. art. HI, §§ 1, 4(a). (See appendix for Constitution Revision Commission's proposed
revision of art. HI, § 17(a), which would permit the house to convene for impeachment
purposes whether or not the senate is in session.)
165. See note 25 supra. The 1957 Journal of the House of Representatives reveals that the
house was preoccupied and distracted by the Holt investigation and debate.
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hers is taken. A two-thirds vote is necessary to impeach.' Normally
a failure to achieve the required two-thirds ends the matter. There
have, however, been exceptions. In 1963, the vote to impeach Judge
Kelly was 72 for and 47 against-less than the requisite two-thirds.
On a motion to reconsider on the following day, the vote changed
to 88 for and 29 against, and Judge Kelly was impeached.' 7 In
addition, on May 17, 1973, when the vote to impeach Lieutenant
Governor Tom Adams failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds
vote, a resolution of censure, based on the same articles, was soon
adopted. "
When an official has been impeached by the house, the articles
are formally presented to the senate.' Traditionally the house of
representatives appoints managers to represent it in presenting to
the senate evidence of the official's guilt.70 This is consistent with
both Florida and congressional precedent. The managers may be
authorized to employ counsel to assist them, and such counsel may
be compensated for their professional services.''
VII. IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE: THE SENATE
The senate may schedule the trial of an impeached official for any
time within six months after impeachment. 7 2 While the senate's
authority in such an impeachment session is restricted to the trial
and related administrative matters,' it is considered to be in ses-
sion for purposes of employing staff and paying members.' Rules
for procedure are adopted by the senate,'75 and the chief justice, or
another justice designated by him, presides-except in a trial of the
chief justice, in which case the Governor presides.'
A Governor has never presided in an impeachment trial in Flor-
ida. Indeed, if he should be so required, the operation of state gov-
ernment would be seriously hampered. The requirement that the
trial begin within six months after impeachment could work a se-
166. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(a). See note 34 supra for discussion of possible questions
involving the number of members by which the two-thirds standard is measured.
167. FLA. H.R. Joua. 2628-29, 2634-37 (Reg. Sess. 1963).
168. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 627, 633 (Reg. Sess. 1973).
169. See, e.g., FLA. H.R. JouR. 1064 (Reg. Sess. 1975); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 2637-38 (Reg. Sess.
1963); see text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
170. See, e.g., FLA. H.R. JouR. 1064 (Reg. Sess. 1975); FLA. H.R. JouR. 2637-38 (Reg. Sess.
1963).
171. 1957 FLA. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 057-212.
172. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17(c).
173. See note 38 supra.
174. 1963 FLA. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 063-88.
175. FLA. CONST. art. I1, § 4(a).
176. Id. § 17(c).
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vere hardship on a presiding chief executive. In a particularly com-
plex case he could be kept from his other constitutional duties for
months, possibly at a time when he is sorely needed elsewhere.
A chief justice has never presided at the trial of another supreme
court justice in Florida. And requiring the chief justice or a justice
designated by him to preside in the impeachment trial of one of the
other members of the supreme court is indeed impractical. Although
the presiding officer of the senate trial does not have a vote, he is
nevertheless required to rule on questions of law and to provide
guidance and leadership for the senators in the usually sensitive and
tense proceedings. To be required to preside at the trial of a col-
league would place the presiding justice in an untenable position.
Questions concerning his objectivity would almost inevitably arise.
It has been suggested to the current Constitution Revision Commis-
sion that the constitution be amended to provide that the Lieuten-
ant Governor or a designated district court of appeal judge preside
at the impeachment trial of a justice of the supreme court.'77
As a court of impeachment, the senate may compel attendance
of witnesses and production of documents and other evidence. In
addition, the senate may punish (by fine not exceeding $1,000 or
imprisonment not exceeding nirety days, or both) any nonmember
who is guilty of disorderly or contemptuous conduct in its presence
or who refuses to obey its lawful summons or to answer lawful ques-
tions.' 8
Although the senate has rules of procedure for its routine legisla-
tive functions, historically it has adopted a complete set of proce-
dural rules on impeachment each time it has organized as a court. 79
When sitting as a court of impeachment, the senate plays a
unique role. It is both judge and jury in a proceeding labeled a trial.
It determines questions of law and fact. It is a court of both original
177. Remarks of Frederick B. Karl to Constitution Revision Commission, Jacksonville,
Florida (Aug. 24, 1977). See appendix for the commission's proposed revision of art. Ill, §
17(c). The Lieutenant Governor had similar responsibilities under the 1868 constitution. FLA.
CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 29.
Having recognized the difficulty involved in requiring justices to judge their colleagues, and
having observed the confusion and criticism that followed the 1975 proceedings of the J.Q.C.
involving justices of the supreme court, the legislature proposed an amendment to art. V, §
12 of the constitution, providing that all justices be disqualified from proceedings initiated
by the J.Q.C. involving one of their fellow justices. In such a case the amendment provided
that the court would consist of the most senior chief judges of each judicial circuit. Fla. HJR
1709 (1975), 1975 Fla. Laws 1123. This amendment was adopted by the voters in November,
1976.
178. FLA. CONST. art. mI, § 5.
179. See, e.g., FLA. S. JoUR. 7-10 (Court of Impeachment 1963); FLA. S. JOUR. 7-9 (Court
of Impeachment 1957); FLA. S. JOUR. 959-67 (Reg. Sess. 1897).
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and final jurisdiction. It performs judicial functions, including,
within constitutional limitations, determination of sentence.""
These quasi-judicial functions notwithstanding, the members are
still senators and, as such, are representatives of their respective
districts. They are selected by their constituents to perform the
usual duties of a legislator but also are constitutionally obligated to
devote the time and energy necessary to try every case in which the
house of representatives votes articles of impeachment.
Symbolic recognition has been accorded this dual senatorial role.
The senators, as senators, are on their oath or affirmation.'"' But
they are asked to take an oath or make an affirmation separate from
their original oath as senators.1 12 This second oath refers specifically
to the impeachment trial, binding the individual senator to the
pursuit of impartial justice.
This pursuit, however, is complicated by the senator's dual role.
Problems arise in every impeachment trial which reveal the inher-
ent difficulty in transforming elected representatives of the people
into temporary judges. Most often these problems involve ex parte
communications and the use by senators of materials extraneous to
the actual impeachment trial in deciding whether to vote for convic-
tion. These are serious offenses in the performance of ordinary judi-
cial duties. 8 ' But an impeachment trial can hardly be described as
an ordinary judicial duty.
The people of Florida are guaranteed the right to instruct their
representatives, and the senators are their representatives." 4 Sena-
tors, therefore, regularly receive telephone calls, letters, and other
communications from various sources. Unless the senate opts to
close an impeachment trial or any part of it, the proceedings are
reported in newspapers and on radio and television. The senators
are not sequestered as are petit juries in trials of major criminal
cases. Consequently, they may read accounts and interpretations of
the proceedings, editorial reactions, and, possibly, published
suggestions about which way they should vote. Direct pressure, in
180. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17. See also brief of Justice Terrell described in note 12 supra.
181. FLA. CONST. art. I1, § 17(c).
182. See, e.g., FLA. S. JOUR. (Court of Impeachment 1963):
I do solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the trial of the impeach-
ment of the Honorable Richard Kelly, Circuit Judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit
of Florida, now pending, I will do impartial justice according to the Constitution
and Laws of the State of Florida; so help me God.
Id. at 10.
183. In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975); In re Dekle, 308 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1975). Both Boyd
and Dekle were concerned with inquiries before the J.Q.C.
184. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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various forms, may be applied by colleagues and by others as well. '
Thus, it is conceivable that a judicial officer could be impeached by
the house for the improper use of ex parte materials or information
and be tried by senators who are not bound by the same rules of
conduct in their trial practice.'86
185. It is virtually impossible for senators to begin an impeachment trial free of knowledge
about the case. Throughout the proceedings in the house, from the beginning of committee
investigations through the vote on adoption of articles of impeachment, media coverage is
extensive. All house proceedings are open, and senators are free to observe them at will. In
addition, the investigation and possible impeachment of any official is invariably a topic of
conversation among other public officials, including senators, who are likely to be friends or
acquaintances of the official being investigated. If impeachment appears to be a real possibil-
ity, the leaders of the senate find it necessary to make plans for the possible trial and are
drawn into discussions of procedure and substance.
Each senator establishes his own course of conduct on this issue. In 1975, during the
investigatory hearing by the house committee responsible for the cases of Justices Boyd,
Dekle, and McCain, Senator Jim Williams, now Lieutenant Governor, frequently refused to
become involved in any conversation about the conduct of the justices. He regularly excused
himself when it appeared that the impeachment proceedings would be discussed, explaining
that he felt he should take his seat in the Court of Impeachment free of prior information or
points of view about the cases. Other senators acted similarly, but some discussed the cases
frequently and openly.
No official record exists that documents the ex parte communications received by Florida
senators in cases that have been tried. Nor has there been any investigation of pressures that
were applied to them. It can safely be assumed, however, that friends, supporters, and
antagonists of the impeached official feel moved to convey their thoughts and desires about
the case to the senators in pending impeachment cases, just as they do with suspension-
removal cases and pending legislation.
That such pressure is an historic problem confronting and confounding courts of impeach-
ment through the years is demonstrated by the following excerpt concerning the impeach-
ment trial of President Andrew Johnson from J. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE (1961):
Ross and his fellow doubtful Republicans were daily pestered, spied upon and
subjected to every form of pressure. Their residences were carefully watched, their
social circles suspiciously scrutinized, and their every move and companions se-
cretly marked in special notebooks. They were warned in the party press, ha-
rangued by their constituents, and sent dire warnings threatening political ostra-
cism and even assassination. Stanton himself, from his barricaded headquarters in
the War Department, worked day and night to bring to bear upon the doubtful
Senators all the weight of his impressive military associations. The Philadelphia
Press reported "a fearful avalanche of telegrams from every section of the country,"
a great surge of public opinion from the "common people" who had given their
money and lives to the country and would not "willingly or unavenged see their
great sacrifice made naught."
The New York Tribune reported that Edmund Ross in particular was
"mercilessly dragged this way and that by both sides, hunted like a fox night and
day and badgered by his own colleague, like the bridge at Arcola now trod upon by
one Army and now trampled by the other."
Id. at 135-36, reprinted by permission of Harper & Row. (Ross's vote for acquittal of President
Johnson cost him his political career. Id. at 141.)
186. Justice E. Harris Drew, presiding at the senate trial of Judge Richard Kelly, admon-
ished the senators and others to avoid discussion of the merits of the case. FLA. S. JOUR. 14-
15 (Court of Impeachment 1963). However, no rule governs, and the senate alone has the
power to punish for any infraction of a rule or an instruction of the presiding officer. See FLA.
CONST. art. III, § 4(d).
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The constitution contains specific authority for the senate to close
its impeachment proceedings." 7 Each set of impeachment rules of
procedure has included a rule allowing closure.' 8 Closure has been
invoked as recently as 1963.111 It has been demonstrated in cases of
executive suspension and removal that closure and executive ses-
sions are not necessary. Senate committees, as well as the full sen-
ate, can function efficiently and without prejudice to the respondent
in full view of the public. 9 ' Thus, it is improbable that the senate
would see fit to close any part of its impeachment proceedings in
the future, even though the authority to do so still exists. 9'
VIII. IMPEACHMENT ALTERNATIVES
Impeachment is not an exclusive punishment for official miscon-
duct. Except for supreme court justices and district court of appeal
judges, officials subject to impeachment are elected officials an-
swerable to the voters for their conduct in office. The 1976 amend-
ments to article V of the constitution provided a merit retention
system for the justices and appellate judges which requires periodic
approval of the electors." Under the new system, the failure of a
justice or appellate judge to receive the approval of a majority of the
electors would create a vacancy in the office. Thus, the voters still
have a method of removing any of the impeachable officers when
they disapprove of the officer's conduct.
187. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 4(a).
188. See, e.g., Rule 19, FLA. S. JouR. 8 (Court of Impeachment 1957). The 1957 rule did
not enumerate the circumstances under which closure could be invoked. Rather, it left that
determination to the senators' discretion.
189. FLA. S. JoUR. 34, 64 (Court of Impeachment 1963).
Although in this example the senate authorized the reporting and publication of what
occurred during the closed session, it was not required to do so. Furthermore, it should be
noted that the journal report did not include the debate, discussion, or any proffer of testi-
mony which may have been made but, rather, included only a statement of the motion and
the vote thereon.
190. Since 1969, all suspension cases heard by the senate select committee or special
master, see FLA. STAT. § 112.47 (1977), have been conducted in open meetings. All sessions
of the senate have been open for all cases. A motion to conduct the consideration in open
session has been made each time the deliberations have begun.
191. Cf. FLA. CONST. art. 19, § 8 (1968, amended 1976) (evidencing the public's desire to
have governmental processes held in open session).
192. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (1968, amended 1976) (proposed by Fla. CS for SJRs 49, 81
[1976], 1976 Fla. Laws 930). Under the system, justices and judges do not run against other
candidates but against their own records. When a justice or judge qualifies for retention, the
voters are asked on the general election ballot whether he should be retained in office. If a
majority vote to retain, he is retained for a new six-year term. If a majority vote not to retain,
a vacancy exists. Such a vacancy is filled by gubernatorial appointment. The Governor's
selection is made from a list given him by the judicial nominating commission. (See appendix
for Constitution Revision Commission's proposed revision of art. V, § 10.)
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But removal by action at the polls can take place only at the end
of a term. There may be a need to act sooner. In addition to the
impeachment process, there are other procedures by which errant
public officials may be removed from office or otherwise punished.
A. Criminal Sanctions
Criminal sanctions are altogether independent of impeachment
proceedings. Criminal laws apply to impeachable public officials,
and conviction or acquittal after impeachment does not affect their
criminal responsibility.'93 Conviction of a felony disqualifies a per-
son from holding office.'94 In addition, any public officer convicted
of a felony involving a breach of the public trust not only loses his
office but also is subject to forfeiture of rights and privileges under
a public retirement plan or pension system.' The impeachment
provisions do not prevent or delay criminal action against an offi-
cial. He may be indicted either before or during impeachment pro-
ceedings, and he may be indicted before he resigns from his office. 9 '
193. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17(c).
194. Id. art. VI, § 4. FLA. STAT. § 114.01(l)(j) (1977), implements this constitutional
provision by providing: "A vacancy in office shall occur: . . . (j) Upon the conviction of the
officer of a felony as defined in s. 10, Art. X of the State Constitution." But see In re Advisory
Opinion to the Governor, 78 So. 673 (Fla. 1918), which held that, for purposes of suspension
from office by way of felony conviction, the office is not deemed vacant until supersedeas has
been terminated.
195. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(d); FLA. STAT, § 121.091(5)(f) (1977). Section 121.091(5)(f)
was amended by the legislature in 1975 by the Act of June 6, 1975, ch. 75-86, § 1, 1975 Fla.
Laws 184, to include the language "or any other felony specified in chapter 838" because of
the problems which arose out of the case of Education Commissioner Floyd T. Christian.
Christian plead nolo contendere to the charge of receiving unlawful compensation contrary
to FLA. STAT. § 838.06 (1973) (Act of June 25, 1973, ch. 73-334, § 32, 1973 Fla. Laws 906)
(repealed 1974). He claimed that a violation of § 838.06 did not come within the prohibitory
language of § 121.091(5)(f) (1973 version), relating to termination of benefits. The trial court
agreed and granted his request not to have his retirement benefits terminated. The First
District Court of Appeal affirmed. Williams v. Christian, 335 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 338 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1976). The First District Court of Appeal determined
that violation of § 838.06 did not constitute bribery within the meaning of § 121.091(5)(f)
(1973 version) (Florida Retirement System Act, ch. 70-112, § 9, 1970 Fla. Laws 398) (current
version at FLA. STAT. § 121.091(5)(f) [1977]), and stated:
The legislature, in providing for forfeiture of pension benefits in Section
121.091(5)(f) in 1973, clearly intended that "bribery" would be applied in those
cases where a "corrupt motive" and an "intent to influence an official act" were
alleged and proved. The state had charged Christian in the instant case with such
conduct. It agreed to plea bargain and in such bargain nolle prossed the bribery
charge against Christian. Section 838.06, F.S. (1973), does not clearly require a
forfeiture of Christian's retirement benefits. This construction is buttressed by the
affidavit of T. Edward Austin, one of Florida's most distinguished state attorneys,
as well as by the subsequent legislative amendments to the two statutes here in-
volved.
335 So. 2d at 361.
196. State ex rel. Christian v. Rudd, 302 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974),
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B. Incapacity
The Governor may be prevented from performing the duties of his
office during any term of incapacity. His incapacity may be deter-
mined by the supreme court after a written suggestion is filed by
four Cabinet members.' 97 Thus, the impeachment process is pre-
served for instances of misconduct.
C. Ethics Commission
The Ethics Commission, established in article II, section 8 of the
1968 constitution, as amended in 1976, has constitutional authority
to conduct investigations and make public reports on all complaints
received concerning breaches of the public trust by public officers
and employees, except those subject to discipline by the Judicial
Qualifications Commission. The scope of the authority of the Ethics
Commission remains uncertain. Although the Ethics Commission
has no power to remove an official, an adverse report may form the
basis of a suspension by the Governor or discipline by the legislature
of one of its members. Such a report is not binding. However, it may
influence an officer's decision about whether to remain in office. It
may also affect his chances for survival at the next election.'
D. Judicial Qualifications Commission
Judicial officers who are subject to impeachment are also subject
to suspension and removal by the supreme court upon the recom-
mendation of two-thirds of the members of the Judicial Qualifica-
tions Commission.' 9 The grounds for such discipline include con-
approved, 310 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1975). But see In re Investigation of a Circuit Judge, 93 So.
2d 601 (Fla. 1957), in which the court held that the Florida Bar could not discipline a judge
until after conviction on impeachment or the end of his judicial tenure.
197. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(b).
198. In 1977, the Florida Ethics Commission reported to the senate that Senator Ralph
Poston had breached the public trust by using his office for his own personal pecuniary gain.
The senate president suspended him from performing the duties of committee chairman and
ordered an investigation by a senate committee. In the fall of 1977, the commission also
prepared a report on five senators who failed to file disclosure statements. The filing of the
reports with the senate was stayed by the First District Court of Appeal, Plante v. Florida
Comm'n on Ethics, 354 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
The senate committee, chaired by Senator Mattox Hair, recommended that Poston be
publicly reprimanded and fined $500. On December 13, 1977, the senate convened in special
session and approved the committee's recommendation. FLA. S. JoUR. 3 (Spec. Sess. 1977).
Briefs and recommendations of the principals involved in this matter are available in the
Florida Supreme Court library and the State Archives.
199. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(f). (See appendix for Constitution Revision Commission's
proposed revision of § 12.)
In Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974), the court observed:
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duct unbecoming a member of the judiciary, demonstrating a pres-
ent unfitness to hold office. The commission may also recommend,
and the court may require, involuntary retirement based on a
judge's permanent disability that interferes with the performing of
his duties. 00 Like the recommendations of the Ethics Commission,
those of the Judicial Qualifications Commission are public records
but are not binding.2 0'
The commission is composed of two judges of district courts of
appeal, two circuit court judges, two county court judges, two mem-
bers of the bar, and five citizens who have never held judicial office
or been a member of the bar. The judges on the commission are
selected by the judges of their respective courts statewide, the bar
members by the governing body of the bar, and the nonbar members
by the Governor. No member except a judge is eligible for state
judicial office as long as he is a member of the commission or for
two years thereafter. Furthermore, no member is allowed to hold
office in a political party, participate in any campaign for judicial
office, or hold public office. However, a member who is a judge may
participate in his own campaign for judicial office and hold that
office.2 02
E. Bar Discipline
Although an impeachable officer may not be removed from office
because of disciplinary action by The Florida Bar, such action may
disqualify him from holding judicial office or the office of attorney
general. An attorney-officer, including a judicial officer, may be
disciplined by the bar after removal from office or resignation. 23
The impeachment process has been cumbersome and costly, and this brought
forth judicial discipline and removal commissions such as our Judicial Qualifica-
tions Commission. These commissions have been operating less than 15 years and
were developed in order to provide an effective disciplinary and administrative
authority which would improve not only the manner of disciplining judicial officers
but also would aid in the administrative operation of the court system.
The Commission provides an alternative means of discipline of judicial officers
for "misdemeanors in office" as prescribed in the impeachment article.
Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
200. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(0.
201. J.Q.C. charges and further proceedings do not become public until the commission
makes a finding of probable cause and files formal charges. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(d).
See note 207 infra for a situation where impeachment proceedings were instituted against
certain justices after the supreme court refused to follow the J.Q.C. recommendation of
removal from office.
202. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)-(b).




It has long been the rule that the Governor may not suspend or
remove from office any officer subject to impeachment. '" In 1956,
however, the court held that the Governor could declare the office
of a missing circuit judge vacant and appoint a successor.2 5 The
judge had disappeared under circumstances suggesting foul play. At
that time, the Judicial Qualifications Commission did not exist.
Today, the commission would undoubtedly be asked to make rec-
ommendations concerning such a situation. Conceivably, however,
the Governor could rely on the 1956 opinion and, under similar
circumstances, declare a vacancy in any office."0 6
IX. CONCLUSION
Given the right of the people to turn impeachable officers out of
office by their votes, the existence of seemingly effective alternatives
for removing from office those who are unfit to serve, and the fact
that no impeached official has ever been convicted by the senate,
one may well question the necessity or advisability of retaining im-
peachment provisions in the Florida constitution.
The simple answer is that impeachment remains the ultimate
remedy for misconduct in high office. Impeachment was included
in the initial draft of the United States Constitution. The people of
Florida have retained impeachment in their constitution since be-
fore statehood. Thus, it is a remedy with a history. It is well under-
stood by most Americans-and probably by most Floridians as well.
The grounds for impeachment are broadly framed and designed
to reach conduct that may not be grounds for discipline under any
other procedure. The penalty imposed may be more than just re-
moval from office. It may include a disqualification to hold any
other office of honor, trust, or profit. Moreover, the impeachment
remedy may be used if and when one of the alternative methods of
discipline does not achieve a result satisfactory to the public.1
204. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 52 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1951); Opinion of the
Justices, 65 So. 224 (Fla. 1914).
205. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 88 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1956).
206. Also, FLA. STAT. § 114.01(2) (1977) allows the Governor to declare an office vacant
by executive order. The grounds for the Governor's determination of such a vacancy appear
in FLA. STAT. § 114.01(1) (1977). They include "the officer's unexplained absence for 60
consecutive days." Id. § 114.01(1)(f).
207. In 1975, the impeachment process was begun against three justices of the Florida
Supreme Court after the court declined to follow the recommendation of the J.Q.C. that two
of them be removed from office. See In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975); In re Dekle, 308
So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1975). As a result of these impeachment activities, two of the justices resigned.
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Appropriately, impeachment has been used only sparingly in
Florida. But when used, it has been effective. Although no convic-
tions have been obtained, the cathartic effects of the proceed-
ings-effects which have an impact on the public as well as the
government-remain manifest. And senate convictions may not be
that important when, as history suggests, an impeached official may
likely resign rather than face the possibility of a conviction. Further-
more, impeachment activity, regardless of its immediate result,
may affect an official's chances in later elections for either the same
or a different office.
208
Thus, impeachment remains an essential means of protecting the
people from the incapacity, negligence, or perfidy of public officials
who sit in the highest echelons of government and who are vested
with the sacred public trust. Its very existence encourages good
government. 20
Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 65, described the na-
ture of impeachment and the rationale for vesting the trial of im-
peachments in the Senate. Hamilton acknowledged the imperfec-
tions of the impeachment process and the real danger of having the
entire procedure dominated by political decisions which are based
on the inflamed passions of the community. However, he also recog-
nized the importance, necessity, and effectiveness of impeachment
On April 8, 1975, Speaker of the House Donald Tucker announced his previous appointment,
under the authority of FLA. CONST. art. HI, § 17(a), of a select committee on impeachment.
FLA. H.R. JoUR. 1 (Reg. Sess. 1975). The committee conducted an investigation and hearings
as to the allegations against Justices Boyd, Dekle, and McCain. No action was recommended
against Justice Boyd. Justice Dekle resigned during the proceedings. On September 28, 1975,
Rep. Rish announced Justice McCain's resignation. FLA. H.R. JoUR. 340 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
208. Both Fuller Warren and Tom Adams, after surviving unsuccessful impeachment
attempts, lost in Democratic gubernatorial primaries. See text accompanying notes 85 and
96 supra. To be sure, many factors probably contributed to their defeats. It is reasonable,
however, to assume that the adverse publicity surrounding the respective impeachment in-
quiries had some impact on the election results.
209. Texas has a procedure known as "address," which allows removal of judges by the
Governor on address of two-thirds of each house of the legislature.
The Judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and District Courts, shall
be removed by the Governor on the address of two-thirds of each House of the
Legislature, for willful neglect of duty, incompetency, habitual drunkennness, op-
pression in office, or other reasonable cause which shall not be sufficient ground for
impeachment; provided, however, that the cause or causes for which such removal
shall be required, shall be stated at length in such address and entered on the
journals of each House; and provided further, that the cause or causes shall be
notified to the judge so intended to be removed, and he shall be admitted to a
hearing in his own defense before any vote for such address shall pass, and in all
such cases, the vote shall be taken by yeas and nays and entered on the journals of
each House respectively.
Tsx. CONST. art. XV, § 8 (emphasis added). This procedure was used recently against Donald
B. Yarbrough, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas. Tex. SCRs 1, 3 (1977).
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in the vindication for society of injuries caused by corrupt public
officials. Hamilton concluded that the power to try impeachments
was appropriately vested in the Senate and that the Senate is the
most fit depository for this authority:
A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments, is an
object more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a govern-
ment wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those
offences which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in
other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They
are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to
the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will
seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and
to divide it into parties, more or less friendly or inimical to the
accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-existing
factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence
and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there
will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regu-
lated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.
The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns
the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the
administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The diffi-
culty of placing it rightly, in a government resting entirely on the
basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it
is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from
that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most
cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account can
hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards
those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.
The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit
depositary of this important trust. Those who can best discern the
intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning
that opinion, and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the
arguments which may be supposed to have produced it.
What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself?
Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the
conduct of public policemen? If this be the design of it, who can
so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives
of the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of
originating the inquiry, or, in other words, of preferring the im-
peachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the
legislative body. Will not the reasons which indicate the propriety
of this arrangement strongly plead for an admission of the other
branch of that body to a share of the inquiry?
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Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal
sufficiently dignified or sufficiently independent? What other body
would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation to
preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality
between an individual accused, and the representatives of the peo-
ple, his accusers?
But though one or the other of the substitutes which have been
examined, or some other that might be devised, should be thought
preferable to the plan, in this respect, reported by the convention,
it will not follow that the Constitution ought for this reason to be
rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of
government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most
exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general
scene of anarchy, and the world a desert .... 210
210. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (A. Hamilton), reprinted in 43 GRAET BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 198-200 (R. Hutchins ed. 1852).
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X. APPENDIX
The following is a list of those proposed revisions to articles III, IV, and V of the Florida
constitution which relate to the subjects discussed in this article and which have been ap-
proved by the Constitution Revision Commission as of the publication deadline. See note 30
supra.
New language within a section is underscored and language that has been deleted is struck
through.
Article III
SECTION 4. Quorum and procedure.-
(d) By a majority vote of its membership each house mayjmnieh-discipline a member top
o pt,-isoderty-eesdwet and, by a two-thirds vote of its membership, may expel a
member. Upon the call of the presiding officer, either house shall convene for such purposes
without the other house being in session.
SECTION 17. Impeachment.-
(a) The governor, lieutenant governor, membenm-ef-the cobinet statewide elected constitu-
tional officers, justices of the supreme court, judges of district courts of appeal, ead-judges
of circuit courts and judges of county courts shall be liable to impeachment for misdemeanor
in office. The house of representatives by two-thirds vote of the membership shall have the
power to impeach an officer and upon the call of the speaker shall convene for this purpose
whether the senate is in session or not. The speaker of the house of representatives shall have
power at any time to appoint a committee to investigate charges against any officer subject
to impeachment.
(b) (No change.)
(c) All impeachments by the house of representatives shall be tried by the senate. The chief
justice of the supreme court, or another justice designated by him, shall preside at the trial,
except in a trial of the chief justice or another justice, in which case the presiding officer shall
be a judicial officer other than a justice, as provided by law gevepnor-eH&peeakie. The senate
shall determine the time for the trial of any impeachment and may sit for the trial whether
the house of representatives be in session or not. The time fixed for trial shall not be more
than six months after the impeachment. During an impeachment trial senators shall be upon
their oath or affirmation. No officer shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds
of the membership qemboeo-of the senate i-sent. Judgment of conviction in cases of im-
peachment shall remove the offender from office and, in the discretion of the senate, may
include disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit. Conviction or acquittal
shall not affect the civil or criminal responsibility of the officer.
Article IV
SiB -4" -(. ab1siet.
4e , Ti'e -shall- be- a- eabiweb -eo ioed f- a -see~easy-e -teter -eB -&ttOrley- geaceal,- a
c ptle -ees 'e,';- e-eernqi oeaep -Eegriure-and.a ,coqims mee-e eeducetii.- In
addit~ne- to -the -power& -end- dtie& sepecified- hereifr,- they- shai- eereise-saeh -pers-and
pesfepm- sueh-d4~iea-ae' eay-bejres eiJed- b-hew.
-(4)-T h- seereteiy-ef- state- shel- keep- the veerds-ef the -official- ects of-tite 4egielative-and
enecut~ve 4depeet ment.
4e -Ths -ett ey ,gereal sh4ll- be-the -cief state 4egal. oiee,.
-(4$-Tte. comptroller- shalir seam es-the 4ef israi offlee? ef4 e-st%- -and e lisettle-aed
approve-&@ooute-agakvt*he -sate.
-(e)-T4e- tes -sA*ll -keel M state 4+mde an& seetitieer He svall disbuse -state -fwade
ortly-tipon- the osder-of- the -compltrele,- eeantersigned-by-the gvvernor:- q e -goverrms-s4haH
cvu tersign, es-a .rmeieiel-dity .-&kjeet .,o-epigim a 1-mamedeqme.
*(f -hoeeemniseiener 4tg-ieikwre-s ai 4eme-sgpeyisione matbers-peeteimkv toe gie"I
ture-eneept. eo-o se-pnwvide4 b5 alw-
"(g-t-T4" - mwssionser- f -edacatimrm shall- snpervise- the-public- eduic+6 -system -i- the
rmmer prescribed-by -law.
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SCHEDULE. (1) Unless otherwise provided herein, all powers, duties, and functions of
cabinet officers provided for in the 1968 constitution and by law shall be transferred to
agencies prescribed by law and the heads of such agencies shall be appointed by the governor
and confirmed by the senate. They shall serve at the pleasure of the governor. Provided,
however, all powers, duties, and functions of the cabinet officers relating to power plant
siting, dredge and fill permits, rules and orders of water management districts and develop-
ments of regional impact shall be transferred to a board appointed by the governor, and
confirmed by the senate.
(2) Officers who were appointed by the governor and approved by three members of the
cabinet, or who were appointed by the governor and cabinet shall be appointed by the
governor and shall be subject to confirmation by the senate.
(3) In the event the revision to Article IV, Section 4 pertaining to the cabinet is adopted
and the revision of Article IX, Section 2 providing for a state board of education is not
adopted, Article IX, Section 2 of the 1968 Constitution shall become a statute subject to
modification or repeal as are other statutes.
(4) The responsibility for settling and approving accounts of the state shall be assigned by
law to an officer who is not the chief fiscal officer responsible for disbursing state funds and
keeping securities.
(5) Except as otherwise provided in this article, revisions to Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8 of Article
IV and this schedule shall be effective on January 4, 1983.
SECTION 7. Suspensions; filling office during suspensions.-
(a) By executive order stating the grounds and filed with the secretary of state, the governor
may suspend from office any state officer not subject to impeachment, any officer of the
militia not in the active service of the United States, or in the active service of the United
States, or any eeoity officer! of a special district or a school district authorized by law to
levy ad valorem taxes, or any municipal or county officer holding an elective office, for
malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability
to perform his official duties, or commission of a felony, and may fill the office by appoint-
ment for the period of suspension. The suspended officer may at any time before removal be
reinstated by the governor.
(b) The senate may, in proceedings prescribed by law, remove from office or reinstate the
suspended official and for such purpose the senate may be convened in special session by its
president or by a majority of its membership.
(c) Any state officer subject to impeachment, if indicted or informed against for a felony,
may disqualify himself from performing any official duties until acquitted or until the indict-
ment or information is dismissed, by filing an irrevocable notice of disqualification with the
secretary of state. The lieutenant governor and any statewide elected constitutional officer
if indicted for a felony, may be disqualified from performing any official duties by the gover-
nor until acquitted or until the indictment is dismissed. The governor may, by appointment,
fill the office during the period of any disqualification. If the governor disqualifies himself,
the lieutenant governor shall act as governor during the period of disqualification. By edep
o'-te. geve~ ay- e e-d-fo 4cla-effie-i ed fr ime-ey-be fion-o
w0 eetted- aml-t4e e4ee 14ed -alpl en t e-peied-e peas ,o eKtead
heyesd.4e e-tees tlhoee .poers. are -ese4 elsewhere 4 6w-oi-the -mtr ieitel-eharter.
Article V
SECTION 10. Retention; election and terms.-
-. @)-Any justice of the supreme court or any judge of a district court of appeal, circuit court
or county court may qualify for retention by a vote of the electors in the general election next
preceding the expiration of his term in the manner prescribed by law. If a justice or judge is
ineligible or fails to qualify for retention, a vacancy shall exist in that office upon the expira-
tion of the term being served by the justice or judge. When a justice of the supreme court or
a judge of a district court of appeal, circuit court, or county court so qualifies, the ballot shall
read substantially as follows: "Shall Justice (or Judge) (name of justice or judge) .. of the
(name of the court) be retained in office?" If a majority of the qualified electors voting on
the question of retention within the territorial jurisdiction of the court vote to retain, the
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justice or judge shall be retained for a term of six years commencing on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in January following the general election. If a majority of the qualified
electors voting on the question of retention within the territorial jurisdiction of the court vote
to not retain, a vacancy shall exist in that office upon the expiration of the term being served
by the justice or judge.
-(44- Girett- jtdges -an-judgeo. f-eo( ty -e0ut9-shkal- be-eleced-hy-vebt& d-o-he <lt1iified
eleete w -e -eyiel-jiesdien-e i h e-peeie- ees.- T-e te r 'of- ewatjugeshaU-be -f ~ -yea .-The-tes .of-jude ¢euny-e 1,s4 -be e? o P i8eS.
SECTION 11. Vacancies.-
(a) The governor shall fill each vacancy on the supreme court, op on a district court of
appeal, on a circuit court, or on a county court by appointing for a term ending on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in January of the year following the next general election
occurring at least one year after the date of appointment, one of not fewer than three persons
nominated by the appropriate judicial nominating commission.
-(,,-Thegwe'o-bll .614l ,eeh.vaeasey-oi. e..-ere~i eevui eqor oe zy ,e4rt.b afpon-
ing-for- a- Wm- eIdng-on -the 4irst-nesday-after -the fimt 4ond -i%- Jaoury-4 .the- yeap
foiowing .tim-ext .priomary. mr generai e4eeiev, -one -4-eb iewer-ham 4hr'ee-pemsowe o i--
neted- by- the-appropritae Anei l-nemsrng.omsis -  -eleetien- shaH-be-held -e-fiH
~het- jidicia1 'oflee-w-th e~er ef the-effiee- beginning & the 4ede 44te-appoe n te tm.
-(.c-I The nominations shall be made within thirty days from the occurrence of a vacancy
or, if sooner, from the acceptance of a resignation by the governor unless the period is
extended by the governor for a time not to exceed thirty days. The governor shall make the
appointment within sixty days after the nominations have been certified to him.
SECTION 12. Discipline; removal and retirement.-
(a) (No change.)
(b) The members of the judicial qualifications commission shall serve staggered terms, not
to exceed six years, as prescribed by general law. No member appointed by the governing
body of the bar of Florida shall be eligible to serve consecutive terms. No member of the
commission except a justice or judge shall be eligible for state judicial office so long as he is
a member of the commission and for a period of two years thereafter. No member of the
commission shall hold office in a political party or participate in any campaign for judicial
office or hold public office; provided that a judge may participate in his own campaign for
judicial office and hold that office. The commission shall elect one of its members as its
chairman.
(c) (No change.)
(d) The commission shall adopt rules regulating its proceedings, the filling of vacancies by
the appointing authorities, the disqualification of members, and the temporary replacement
of disqualified or incapacitated members. The commission's rules, or any part thereof, may
be repealed by general law enacted by a majority vote of the membership of each house of
the legislature, or by the supreme court, five justices concurring. Until formal charges against
a justice or judge are filed by the commission with the clerk of the supreme court of Florida
all proceedings by or before the commission shall be confidential; provided, however, upon a
finding of probable cause and the filing by the commission with said clerk of such formal
charges against a justice or judge such charges and all further proceedings before the commis-
sion shall be public.
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